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ABSTRACT

DANCING WITH MNEMIC NEGLECT: NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE PARADIGM
Bettina Zengel, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2016
John Skowronski, Director

Self-protection motivation is seen as a cause of the mnemic neglect phenomenon, the
reduced recall for self-threatening information as compared to other-referent negative
information. The phenomenon is well established, but there are still many areas that would
benefit from further exploration. For example, while several moderators of the mnemic neglect
phenomenon have been found, regulatory focus has not yet been considered. Furthermore, the
assumed cognitive processes that underlie the mnemic neglect phenomenon are generally seen as
occurring because of processes occurring during the encoding phase of information processing.
However, it is possible that recall processes that occur after information storage may also
contribute to mnemic neglect. This possibility has not yet been explored. Finally, in past
research the traits and behaviors used for the mnemic neglect paradigm have all been located on
the morality trait dimension. The domain of competence, a second major dimension of human
traits, has not been explored in the context of the mnemic neglect paradigm. The research in this
dissertation therefore pursues three goals: (1) it attempts to establish regulatory focus as a
moderator of mnemic neglect, (2) it explores whether the processes that contribute to mnemic
neglect extend beyond encoding processes and extend into recall processes, and (3) it extends the
paradigm from traits and behaviors in the morality domain to traits and behaviors in the
competence domain. Implications of these results for the self, memory, and social cognition are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Memory is a strange sieve: it retains everything good of us and everything bad of others.
--- Wieslaw Brudzinski

Scholars have long established that a positive self-view, even if it is based on positive
illusions, contributes to our mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Indeed, it is believed that
most people are psychologically healthy because, in part, they tend to think well about
themselves (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). This positive self-thought can be seen in several
tendencies: (1) people rate their traits as being more positive than the traits possessed by the
average person, (2) people see themselves as more likely to perform positive behaviors than the
average person, and (3) people judge themselves to be less affected by biases than other people
(Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).
However, these positive self-views can be challenged by negative information. This
negative information can include negative feedback that a person receives from others, as might
happen when a supervisor tells an employee that the employee is making too many on-the-job
errors. Such negative feedback can heighten self-protection motivation (Alicke & Sedikides,
2009), and research (Sedikides & Green, 2000) suggests that this self-protection motivation can
lessen how readily a person recalls self-relevant negative information. A specific example of
this phenomenon emerges in research showing that negative information that challenges self-
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perceptions in important areas tends to be recalled more poorly than when that exact same
information is descriptive of another person. This phenomenon is termed mnemic neglect.

The Mnemic Neglect Effect

Sedikides and Green (2000, Study 1) developed the mnemic neglect paradigm to explore
the effect of self-protection motivation on an individual’s memory for negative feedback. They
adapted the person memory paradigm (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) to present participants with
behaviors that were presented as feedback from a personality test. (The feedback said, “These are
the kinds of things that the test says that you could do.”). The behaviors implied traits that were
either important to the self (central) or not important to the self (peripheral) and that were either
positive in valence or negative in valence. The nature of the traits (central to the self-concept or
peripheral to the self-concept) and behaviors, as well as trait valence and the trait-descriptiveness
of the behaviors, were established in extensive pretesting. In the mnemic neglect paradigm, after
participants had read the behaviors and completed a distracter task, they were then asked to recall
as many of the behaviors as possible without worrying about recalling them verbatim. It was
expected that behaviors that implied central traits and that were negative would be especially
self-threatening if the referent was the self, but not if the referent was another person. Sedikides
and Green (2000) predicted that this high self-threat should lead to reduced recall.
Indeed, the typical outcome of research using this paradigm is that there is reduced recall
of self-referent/negative/central trait dimension-relevant behaviors. Although this reduction in
recall for self-referent/negative/central trait dimension-relevant behaviors occurs relative to all
other central dimension behavior conditions, the reduction is most cleanly interpreted in
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comparison to recall in the condition in which the negative behaviors are said to describe another
person (typically named Chris) instead of the participant. However, the selfreferent/negative/central trait dimension-relevant behavior memories are not lost to memory;
they can still be accessed with recognition tests (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008). Hence,
although the self-referent/negative/central trait dimension-relevant behaviors are stored in
memory, they do not seem to be stored in a way that promotes easy retrieval.
The mnemic neglect effect in recall seems to be relatively robust to different methods of
presenting the feedback. For example, many studies (Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2005; Green &
Sedikides, 2004; Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Newman, Nibert, & Winer, 2009; Newman,
Sapolsky, Tang, & Bakina, 2014; Saunders, 2011, 2013; Saunders, Barawi, & McHugh, 2013,
Sedikides & Green, 2004; Zengel, Skowronski, Valentiner, & Sedikides, 2015) have used the
minimalistic approach of simply asking participants to consider the behaviors as real and as
stemming from someone who knows them (or Chris) well (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Study 2).
However, that is not to say that the mnemic neglect effect always occurs robustly across
conditions. Several moderators of the mnemic neglect effect have been identified. For example,
the effect is diminished or even disappears for those who: (1) received an ego-inflation
manipulation prior to receiving the feedback (Green et al., 2008), (2) were primed with selfimprovement strivings (Green, Sedikides, Pinter, & Van Tongeren, 2009, Study 1), (3) believed
that the behaviors were sent by a close relationship partner (Green et al., 2009, Study 2), or (4)
were exposed to mindfulness training (Saunders et al., 2013). Several individual differences also
are related to the phenomenon. Specifically, those high in defensive pessimism do not display
the mnemic neglect effect (Newman et al., 2009), and it was also reduced for individuals with
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dysphoria (Saunders, 2011), trait anxiety (Saunders, 2013), or social anxiety (Zengel et al.,
2015).
New Opportunites to Understand and Explore Mnemic Neglect

The mnemic neglect phenomenon is well established, but there are still many areas that
would benefit from further exploration. For example, while several moderators of the mnemic
neglect phenomenon have been found, regulatory focus has not yet been considered as a variable
that may play a moderating role in mnemic neglect. Furthermore, mnemic neglect effects are
generally assumed to occur because of processes occurring during the encoding phase of
information processing (lowered attention to and elaboration of the negative feedback).
However, it is possible that recall processes that occur after information storage may also
contribute to mnemic neglect. This possibility has not often been explored. Finally, in past
research the traits and behaviors used in the mnemic neglect paradigm have all been rooted in
morality. The domain of competence, a second major dimension of human traits, has not been
explored in the context of the mnemic neglect paradigm. Thus, the research for this dissertation
therefore pursued three main goals: (1) to establish regulatory focus as a moderator of mnemic
neglect, (2) to explore whether the processes that contribute to mnemic neglect extend beyond
encoding processes and extend into recall processes, and (3) to extend the paradigm from traits
and behaviors in the morality domain to traits and behaviors in the competence domain and
explore whether the memory effects that emerge in the morality domain might extend to, or
might differ from, the pattern of effects observed in the competence domain. The studies that are
described in this dissertation describe how I pursued these opportunities.

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

Linking Mnemic Neglect to Regulatory Focus

As previously noted, one possible moderator of mnemic neglect that has not yet been
explored is regulatory focus. This idea is interesting because the conceptual core of the mnemic
neglect paradigm lies in the self-threat that negative trait-implying behaviors represent when (1)
the behavior refers to the self and (2) the implied trait is central to the self-concept. However,
mnemic neglect research also seems to assume that all negative information that is important to
the self is treated in the same way.
Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 2012) points out that this equal treatment
assumption may be incorrect. This theory suggests that one can have different emotional
reactions to discrepancies between the self-concept that is implied by negative behaviors and
ideal self-guides and between the self-concept that is implied by negative behaviors and ought
self-guides. The ideal self consists of our private ideas of how we would like ourselves to be.
The ought self is based on how we think we ought to be (often based on the expectations of
others). In self-discrepancy theory, self-concept/ideal self discrepancies can produce dejectionrelated emotions such as disappointment or shame, while self-concept/ought self discrepancies
can produce agitation-related emotions such as guilt, apprehension, or anxiety (Higgins, 1987).
It is here that the link to mnemic neglect is forged. As noted earlier, mnemic neglect is reduced
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in individuals who are dysphoric, anxious, or socially anxious (Saunders, 2011, 2013; Zengel et
al., 2015).
This link suggests that other elements of self-discrepancy theory might similarly
moderate mnemic neglect. One other element reflects an individual’s motives for goal pursuit.
Goals derived from the ideal self and goals derived from the ought self are thought to be linked
to an individual’s regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997, 2012). People can sometimes try to achieve
self-goals via a promotion focus, which reflects pursuit of an individual’s aspirations. People
can also try to achieve self-goals via a prevention focus, which reflects pursuit of obligations.
One open question of interest is whether an individual’s regulatory focus moderates mnemic
meglect.
Promotion focus orientation and prevention focus orientation can be observed on both the
state level and the trait level (Higgins, 2012). For example, there are chronic measurable
individual differences in these orientations, and these chronic individual differences can be
influenced by an individual’s cultural experience (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). However, a
promotion focus and a prevention focus can also each be induced by the situation (Higgins,
Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Winterheld & Simpson, 2011). These inductions are often
accomplished by either asking people to write about their hopes and aspirations in life
(promotion focus) or about their duties and obligations in life (prevention focus).

Regulatory Focus and Recall: Past Findings

Given that this dissertation is exploring links between regulatory focus and recall, it
would be desirable for existing research to already show that such a link exists. A few studies
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have not yielded evidence of a link between regulatory focus and recall. For example, FriedmanWheeler, Rizzo-Busack, McIntosh, Ahrens, and Haaga (2010) tried to determine if priming
affects memory for smoking-related narratives. They expected that participants in a promotion
focus condition would better recall narratives reflecting approach strategies than those in a
prevention focus condition. They also expected that those in a prevention focus condition would
better recall narratives reflecting avoidance strategies than those in a promotion focus condition.
These hypotheses were not supported. Instead, the recall data showed that participants (1)
recalled smoking narratives better when the described person's goal was smoking to avoid an
undesired state and (2) recalled abstaining narratives better when the target's goal was to
approach a desired state. A second example of the failure of regulatory focus to predict memory
was provided by Touryan, Johnson, Mitchell, Farb, Cunningham & Raye (2007). They
manipulated regulatory focus through a writing task and then monitored brain activity through an
fMRI while participants evaluated emotion words as good or bad. This was later followed by a
surprise recall task. Results revealed enhanced posterior cingulate cortex activity for positive
emotion words in the promotion focus condition and for negative emotional words in the
prevention focus condition. The authors linked this brain activity to the process of referencing
the words to the self, which should have increased memory. However, recall results revealed
only overall enhanced memory for participants in the prevention focus condition. On the
memory measure, regulatory focus did not interact with the valence of the emotion words.
However, studies that find no link between differences in regulatory focus and recall tend
to be the exception instead of the rule. For example, a prevention focus has been linked to better
recall for: (1) emotional words regardless of valence (Touryan et al., 2007), (2) episodes
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containing means of avoidance regardless of valence of the episode (Higgins et al., 1994; Seibt,
& Förster, 2004), (3) stereotype-incongruent targets and the color of the background the
information was presented on when individuals demonstrated modern sexism (Förster, Higgins,
& Strack, 2000), (4) negative affect for a past event regardless of the valence of the event
(Pattershall, Eidelman, & Beike, 2012), and (5) details of a fictional tennis match when an
interdependent self-construal was primed (Aaker & Lee, 2001). Prevention focus under
stereotype threat has also been linked to fewer errors in recall but poorer overall recall (Barber,
& Mather, 2015). In contrast, promotion focus has been linked to increased recall: (1) for
episodes containing means of approach regardless of valence of the episode (Higgins et al., 1994;
Seibt, & Förster, 2004), (2) of course material when it is presented by an angry rather than a
happy teacher (van Doorn, van Kleef, & van der Pligt, 2014), (3) of positive affect for a past
event regardless of the valence of the event (Pattershall et al., 2012), and (4) for details of a
fictional tennis match when an independent self-construal was primed (Aaker & Lee, 2001).
One thread that is evident in this past research and that is relevant to the current
dissertation is that while regulatory focus can be linked to memory, regulatory focus may not
selectively affect memory for information that differs in valence (e.g., Higgins et al., 1994;
Touryan et al., 2007). Given the mnemic neglect paradigm’s focus on valence, it might seem to
some that the use of the paradigm might not be especially suitable as a vehicle to explore how
regulatory focus might affect memory.
However, this lack of suitability may be an illusion. In theory, a prevention focus ought
to be linked to heightened sensitivity to the presence of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997).
Thus, a straightforward expectation is that self-central negative behaviors should be perceived as
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particularly threatening by those in a prevention focus, which may lead to an increased mnemic
neglect effect. Moreover, one reason why some past regulatory focus research exploring links
between regulatory focus and valence has not found valence effects is that the research has not
made a distinction between various kinds of valenced stimuli. For example, one possibility is
that regulatory focus may interact with event valence to affect event recall only when stimuli are
especially relevant to a given self-guide. This possibility is raised by the overall recall pattern
observed in studies of mnemic neglect: mnemic neglect effects occur most strongly for stimuli
that are important to the self. Hence, one reason to use the mnemic neglect paradigm in
association with the variable of regulatory focus is to assess the possibility that regulatory focus
effects on memory may only emerge when stimuli have high self-importance.
This possibility is further suggested by research exploring relations between social
anxiety and memory. Past research shows that social anxiety levels do not consistently moderate
selective recall for valenced words (see Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Heinrichs & Hofman 2001;
Mitte, 2008). However, these kinds of moderation effects are robustly evident when explored
using the kinds of highly self-relevant stimuli employed by the mnemic neglect paradigm (see
Zengel et al., 2015).
The other advantage offered by the mnemic neglect paradigm is that it does not have to
rely on between-valence comparisons to examine effects of regulatory focus on memory.
Because in typical memory studies the set of positive stimuli presented to participants almost
always differs from the set of negative stimuli presented to participants, comparing recall for
positive stimuli with recall for negative stimuli, though theoretically interesting, can also present
an interpretive challenge The mnemic neglect paradigm can help to bypass this difficulty by
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examining the effects of regulatory focus on recall for the same given behavior that is described
as enacted by different targets (the self vs. another person). Hence, instead of comparing “apples
to oranges,” as typically happens when examining valence effects in recall, the mnemic neglect
paradigm allows examination of “apples to apples.” That is, the paradigm examines how recall
for the same behavior as performed by a different target (self vs. other) might be affected by
variables such as the self-importance of the behavior and an individual’s regulatory focus. To
my knowledge, findings that show that regulatory focus effects emerge only for self-important
stimuli would be new to the regulatory focus literature. My studies pursued such a finding by
manipulating or measuring an individual’s regulatory focus and examining the effects of
regulatory focus on feedback recall in the mnemic neglect paradigm.

Study 1 Overview

This initial dissertation study hoped to add to knowledge about memory in the mnemic
neglect paradigm by seeing if regulatory focus is an additional moderator of the mnemic neglect
effect. In theory, a prevention focus ought to be linked to heightened sensitivity to the presence
of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997). Given this finding, it was hypothesized that for people in
a prevention focus condition, self-central negative behaviors would be perceived as particularly
threatening, which could lead to an increased mnemic neglect effect.
This idea was explored in two ways. First, a regulatory focus manipulation was used
prior to the mnemic neglect procedures to prime either a promotion focus or a prevention focus.
In addition, the trait-level regulatory focus of participants was assessed in all conditions. Hence,
the design and the measures allowed explorations of whether regulatory focus moderates mnemic
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neglect and did so using both state manipulations of regulatory focus and trait-like measures of
regulatory focus.
Another interest in the first study was whether a promotion focus enhances recall for selfimportant positive behaviors. In theory, a promotion focus is linked to sensitivity to the presence
of positive outcomes. This idea raises the possibility that a self-enhancement effect in memory
might emerge for high-promotion-focus participants.

Hypotheses

(1) Negative central self-referent behaviors will be recalled less well than negative central Chrisreferent behaviors (replication of mnemic neglect effect).
(2) Prevention focus participants will evince an increased mnemic neglect effect. Specifically,
negative central self-referent behaviors will be recalled even more poorly than negative
central Chris-referent behaviors:
(a) for individuals measured to be high in prevention focus;
(b) for primed prevention focus participants when compared to participants in the control
condition and/or participants in the promotion focus condition.
(3) Promotion focus participants will exhibit a self-enhancement effect. Specifically, they will
exhibit enhanced recall for important self-framed positive behaviors relative to important
Chris-framed positive behaviors:
(a) for individuals measured to be high in promotion focus;
(b) for primed promotion focus participants when compared to the control condition
participants and/or participants in the prevention focus condition.
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(4) The above hypothesized effects might not be specific to the central traits but might emerge
regardless of trait type (see Zengel et al., 2015, for an example of peripheral traits mimicking
patterns observed on central traits).

Method

Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They received 50 cents
as compensation for their participation.
Previous research results (Zengel et al., 2015) evinced an effect size of ηp2 = .038 for the
two-way interaction between the referent and valence for the trustworthy trait. According to the
results of an analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2, to achieve a power of .95 with α = .05 for the two
between-participant groups (self vs. Chris) and the two repeated measures at an average
correlation among repeated measures of .24, a total sample size of 128 would be required.
Reversely, for 150 participants (assuming none had to be eliminated during data screening) the
expected power is .98. To detect interactions between this two-way interaction with the
regulatory focus variable (with the levels prevention focus, promotion focus, and control
condition) a conservative estimate of 3 × 150 = 450 participants was the target for recruitment.
However, because regulatory focus was measured in the control condition, and because some
planned analyses might have focused only on data from the control condition, to achieve
sufficient sensitivity in analyses the number of participants in the control condition needed to be
doubled. Hence, a total of 600 participants were targeted to be recruited for Study 1.
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Participants who did not remember any of the 32 displayed behaviors and did not
complete the study (109), who completed the study but did not remember any of the behaviors
(61), who were not native English speakers (31), who were assigned to the Chris condition and
were themselves named Chris (3), or who indicated that they took notes during the display of the
behaviors (5) were excluded from the data set. It is not uncommon for participants recruited
through MTurk to take a look at a study and to discontinue it if it is not to their liking. Turkitron
(Turkitron.com) was used in combination with MTurk to ensure that participants could not take
the study later after starting to participate and discontinuing. Turkitron was also used to ensure
that none of the participants of Study 1 could participate in the other dissertation studies.
Of the remaining 530 participants, 528 indicated their age (range: 18 to 78 years, M =
36.69, SD = 13.55). The majority of participants were female (68.9%) and Caucasian (78.9%;
African American: 7%, Hispanic: 4%, Asian: 3.6%, Native American: 0.4%, bi- or multi-racial:
4.0%, other: 1.9%, skipped question: 0.4%).

Materials and Procedure

Participants were guided through the computerized experiment by the Qualtrics survey
platform. The survey was restricted to the U.S. and Canada, and participants had to indicate that
they were native English speakers before they could continue with the study. After agreeing to
the consent form by entering their MTurk ID, participants were randomly assigned to: (1) a
promotion focus condition in which they were asked to list up to three hopes and aspirations, (2)
a prevention focus condition in which they were asked to list up to three duties and obligations or
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(3) a control condition in which the writing task was skipped. The regulatory focus
manipulations were based on Winterheld and Simpson (2011; see Appendix A).
At this point the regular mnemic neglect paradigm started. Participants were asked to
consider the behavior descriptions as real. They were randomly assigned to either a self or Chris
condition. In the self condition the behaviors were presented in the first person while in the
Chris condition all behaviors referred to Chris (see Appendix B for the behaviors and alternative
referent framings). In both conditions, each behavior description was displayed for 8 s before
automatically moving on to the next behavior description, with the descriptions presented in a
random order unique to each participant. Participants then completed a 2.5 min distracter task.
They listed as many U.S. states as they could remember within that time frame.
Afterwards, participants were presented with a surprise recall task. They were prompted
to enter one behavior at a time into a response box until they indicated that they could not recall
any more behaviors. The behavior that was described disappeared from the screen after it was
entered and a new response box appeared in preparation for each new typed entry (a procedure
recommended by Newman et al., 2014). After exhausting their recall, participants then
completed the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001) and provided
demographic data including information about whether they were native English speakers and
whether their first name was Chris. Next, participants received a debriefing statement and were
thanked for their participation.
The RFQ is included in Appendix C. The promotion focus subscale consists of six items
and in Study 1 displayed a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .73. The prevention focus
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subscale consists of five items and in Study 1 displayed a Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient
of .82.
The RFQ was initially intended to be used in analyses of data from participants in the
control condition but was administered to all participants; some analyses eventually used the
RFQ data from all participants. The scale has trait-like properties, so I expected that responses to
this scale would be of limited utility as a manipulation check in the priming conditions. Instead,
following the procedure from Winterheld and Simpson (2011, Study 2), I checked the
effectiveness of the manipulation by ensuring that participants completed the priming conditions
as instructed. Thus, I examined the actual answers provided in each priming condition (their
hopes/aspirations or duties/obligations) to ensure that the manipulation was not skipped and that
responses corresponded to the intent of the priming manipulation. No additional participants
were excluded based on this check.
To account for possible problems with distractions for participants who completed the
study outside of the relative control of a lab environment, participants were informed at the
beginning of the mnemic neglect procedure that this was a psychological study and that they
should not take any notes during the display of material. They were also informed that the
behaviors were automatically displayed one at a time for 8 s each before a new behavior was
automatically displayed. They were asked to pay attention and read the behaviors until the
survey informed them that they were done with this part of the study. Additionally, participants
were also asked to rate how attentive they were during the behavior display (Scale: 0 to 6 with
anchors labeled at 0 not at all attentive, 3 moderately attentive, and 6 extremely attentive) and at
the end of the study how much they were distracted during the study (Scale: 0 to 6 with anchors
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labeled at 0 not at all distracted, 3 moderately distracted, and 6 extremely distracted). To ensure
honest answers, participants were informed that their responses would not affect their payment.
Two attention items were also inserted into the individual difference measure. These last
attention checks asked participants to select a specific point on the scale. Additionally,
participants were asked at the end of the study if English was their native language and if they
had taken notes during the display of the behaviors at the beginning of the study.

Results

Memory Coding and Data Cleaning

The recalled behaviors were coded according to a gist criterion (Sedikides & Green,
2000; the coding scheme is presented in Appendix D). Two independent raters determined if the
gist of the recalled behavior matched the gist of one of the originally displayed behaviors. The
percentage of interrater agreement was 94.93%. Disagreements were resolved through
discussion.
To be consistent with past research practices, participants with more than three intrusions
(i.e., recalled behaviors that did not match any of the previously displayed behaviors or recalled
behaviors that were reversed in valence compared to the original behaviors) were excluded from
the analysis. This resulted in the exclusion of four participants.
Accurate matches between the recalled behaviors and the presented behaviors were
tallied separately for each within-subjects cell of the paradigm (e.g., the total number of recalled
behaviors for the central negative cell). These raw values were then divided by the number of
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behaviors that could have been recalled for each cell (8). The resulting proportions were the
dependent measure for the analyses that were conducted.
To further reduce error due to participants not having paid attention during the display of
the behaviors, the attention self-rating was analyzed (M = 4.98, SD = 1.08; see Figure 1). Ratings
of 2 and below were more than two standard deviations below the mean. This pattern was very
similar throughout all the dissertation studies.

Figure 1. Frequency of Attentiveness Ratings in Study 1.

Based on these data, a general attention rating cutoff for participation was established.
Participants with attentiveness ratings of 3 or below were excluded from the analyses. This led to
the exclusion of another 12 participants from the data analysis. Examination of these exclusions
suggested that they were neutral with regards to the behavior referent variable (self vs. Chris).
For example, results from a logistic regression analysis showed that when a categorical variable
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was created by splitting the attention rating (to a group of attention rating of 2 or below and a
group of attention rating of above 2), then this variable did not significantly predict behavior
referent (p = .14). Thus, after exclusions, a total of 514 participants therefore remained for the
analyses, as described next.

Overview of Analyses

One set of planned analyses explored the effect of priming promotion focus vs.
prevention focus on the mnemic neglect effect. To this purpose, a 3 (Priming Condition:
promotion focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2
(Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-method
ANOVA was conducted with behavior referent and priming condition as between-subjects
variables. If the priming was successful a significant four-way interaction might emerge
showing that the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction that often
emerges from the data in the mnemic neglect paradigm (indicating poor recall for self-framed
and central information relative to other central information) was moderated by the priming
manipulation. Alternatively, a three-way interaction between the priming condition, behavior
valence and behavior referent may emerge, but this should still indicate that memory for selfrelevant negative information was moderated by the goal priming manipulation.
A second set of analyses were performed to consider the extent to which the data
depended on the extent to which participants were engaged in the experiment. These analyses
were prompted by concerns about the tendency of MTurk workers to be relatively inattentive to
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material presented to them when compared to students in traditional academic samples
(Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013).
A third set of planned analyses focused on the relations between the individual difference
measures of promotion focus and prevention focus and the mnemic neglect effect. This interest
was pursued by conducting pooled within-subjects hierarchical regression analyses similar to
those reported by Zengel et al. (2015). The focus of these analyses was the possible moderation
of the usual effects indicative of mnemic neglect by these individual difference measures. A
significant four-way interaction effect might emerge showing that the typical three-way mnemic
neglect interaction was moderated by trait regulatory focus. Alternatively, a three-way
interaction effect of regulatory focus, behavior valence, and behavior referent may emerge
indicating that memory for self-relevant negative information was moderated by trait regulatory
focus.

Evaluation of Possible Moderation of Mnemic Neglect by Regulatory Focus Priming

One set of analyses evaluated whether the mnemic neglect effect might be moderated by
the regulatory focus priming manipulation. The primary analysis exploring this question was a 3
(Priming Condition: promotion focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2 (Trait Type: central
vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs.
Chris) mixed-method ANOVA. Trait type and behavior valence were within-subjects variables
in this analysis.
The results of this analysis (see Appendix E for the full results produced by this
ANOVA) yielded many significant effects (Trait Type × Behavior Valence, Behavior Valence ×

20
Behavior Referent and main effects for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent)
whose interpretations are qualified by a significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction that is typical of mnemic neglect studies, F(1, 508) = 5.93, p = .02, ηp2 = .01.
Examination of the means for this interaction (see Table 1) revealed a pattern that nicely
replicates the mnemic neglect effect.

Table 1
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Recall Proportions in Study 1
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.27 (.18)

.19 (.15)

.10 (.12)

.06 (.11)

Chris-referent

.29 (.17)

.27 (.18)

.12 (.12)

.09 (.11)

Referent

Analyses that decomposed this interaction effect showed that there was a significant
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent effect for recall of central behaviors, F(1, 512) = 8.01, p
= .01, ηp2 = .02, but not for recall of peripheral behaviors (p = .41). Analyses decomposing the
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent effect for recall of central behaviors yielded no
significant difference in recall for self-referent (M = .27, SD = .18) or Chris-referent (M = .29,
SD = .17) positive behaviors (p = .10), but did reveal that self-referent negative behaviors (M =
.19, SD = .15) are recalled less often than Chris-referent negative behaviors (M = .27, SD = .18),
F(1, 512) = 23.89, p < .01, ηp2 = .05. Thus, these data clearly show that, relative to recall for
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other central behaviors, recall for negative behaviors was especially poor when the behaviors
were also self-referent.
The results of the analysis did not suggest that this interaction effect was further qualified
by the priming manipulation (Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming
Condition, F(2, 508) = 1.80, p = .17, ηp2 = .01). The descriptive results (means and standard
deviations) are listed in Table 2.
Despite the non-significance of the four-way interaction, because this interaction was the
focus of Study 1, I examined the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent effect
separately in each priming condition (for full results, see Appendix F). This three-way
interaction effect was not significant in the control condition (p = .71), nor was the three-way
interaction effect significant in the prevention focus condition (p = .31). Only the promotion
focus condition yielded a significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
interaction effect, F(1, 109) = 6.00, p = .02, ηp2 = .05. Further breakdown of the significant threeway interaction effect in the promotion focus condition showed that there was a significant twoway interaction effect between behavior valence and behavior referent for central behaviors, F(1,
109) = 8.62, p < .01, ηp2 = .07, but not for peripheral behaviors (p = .72). When only central
behaviors in the promotion focus condition were examined, there was no significant difference in
recall between self-referent positive behaviors and Chris-referent positive behaviors (p = .86); in
contrast, self-referent negative behaviors (M = .19, SD = .15) were recalled more poorly than
Chris-referent negative behaviors (M = .29, SD = .19), F(1, 109) = 8.50, p < .01, ηp2 = .07.
Hence, in the promotion focus condition the data are entirely consistent with the idea of selfprotective memory: people exhibited especially poor recall for negative behaviors, especially
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Table 2
Mean Recall Proportion (and Standard Deviations) per Priming Condition in Study 1
Control Condition
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.26 (.17)

.20 (.15)

.11 (.13)

.07 (.11)

Chris-referent

.30 (.16)

.27 (.18)

.12 (.13)

.09 (.10)

Referent

Prevention Focus Condition
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.26 (.20)

.17 (.16)

.09 (.11)

.06 (.11)

Chris-referent

.29 (.17)

.25 (.18)

.12 (.12)

.09 (.11)

Referent

Promotion Focus Condition
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.28 (.18)

.19 (.15)

.07 (.10)

.07 (.12)

Chris-referent

.28 (.17)

.29 (.18)

.12 (.12)

.10 (.13)

Referent

when those behaviors were self-relevant and self-central.
However, despite the non-significance of the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effect in the control condition and in the prevention focus condition, the
overall absence of a four-way interaction effect and the patterns of means exhibited in all
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conditions (see Table 2) are most consistent with two ideas. First, there is evidence of a selfprotective memory effect in all goal priming conditions. Second, this effect seems to be of
roughly the same magnitude in all the priming conditions. (In the negative behavior/self central
condition, the Chris condition minus self condition difference score was .07 in the control
condition, .08 in the prevention focus priming condition, and .10 in the promotion focus priming
condition.)
To further explore these conclusions, another set of analyses (for results see Appendix G)
discarded recall for the positive behaviors and focused on recall of the negative behaviors. The
recall proportions for the negative behaviors were entered into a 3 (Priming Condition:
promotion focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) x 2
Trait Type (self-central vs. self-peripheral) ANOVA. Results of the analysis showed that there
was a significant Trait Type × Behavior Referent effect, F(1, 508) = 8.74, p = .003, ηp2 = .02.
Decomposition of the effect showed that for peripheral negative behaviors, self-referent
behaviors (M = .06, SD = .11) were recalled more poorly than Chris-referent effects, F(1, 512) =
8.20, p = .004, ηp2 = .02. This reduced recall was even stronger for central negative behaviors
(Self: M = .19, SD = .15; Chris: M = .27, SD = .18), F(1, 512) = 23.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. In
accordance with the previous findings that suggested that self-protective memory was not
modified by priming condition, the Trait Type × Behavior Referent interaction was not
moderated by priming condition (p = .92).
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Exploratory Analyses: Was the Action of the Goal Priming Manipulation Related to Participant
Engagement?
Some authors have raised questions about the attentiveness of MTurk participants to
experimental material (Goodman et al., 2013). Given this concern, it is reasonable to wonder
whether the relative impotence of the priming manipulation might be linked to those participants
who were not fully engaged in the study, and I collected two measures that could be used to
assess this idea. One is the self-report measure of how attentive each participant was to the
behaviors (obtained right after the behavior display), and the second was the self-report measure
of how distracted each participant was during the study (obtained at the end of the study). These
measures may not index the same underlying construct because the attentiveness measure was
framed so that it applied only to the behavior display, while the distractedness measure (M =
1.23, SD = 1.36) pertained to the entire study. There certainly was a range of responses to both
the attentiveness measure (Figure 1) and the distractedness measure (Figure 2). For the analyses
that follow, this latter measure was reverse scored so higher values reflect less distraction.
Preliminary correlational analyses (without using the exclusion based on attentiveness,
i.e., with 526 participants) suggested that both ratings predicted performance on the memory
task, with high attention and less distraction predicting better memory (see Table 3). The data
also showed that the attentiveness ratings and the distraction ratings were moderately correlated
(r = .55, p < .001) and that an index formed by summing these two measures also predicted recall
in the study (see Table 3).
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Figure 2. Frequency of Overall Distractedness Ratings in Study 1.

Table 3
Correlation with Overall Recall Proportions of Attentiveness, Reverse-Coded Distractedness,
and Index of Both Measures
Attentiveness

(recoded)
Distractedness

Index

Central-Positive

.21**

.14**

.19**

Central-Negative

.18**

.13**

.18**

Peripheral-Positive

.11*

.07

.10*

Peripheral-Negative

.06

0.2

.04

Total Recall

.21**

.14**

.19**

Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05

Given these results, I conducted three exploratory hierarchical regression analyses.
These analyses were conducted in a manner similar to that employed by Zengel and colleagues
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(2015). After centering the continuous variables, a pooled within-subjects hierarchical
regression was conducted. These analyses all included the 3 (Priming Condition: promotion
focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior
Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) design that was examined
in the ANOVA, but added to these variables a variable designed to assess engagement (the main
effect, as well as all interactions with other variables) in the study. For one analysis, this
engagement variable was the centered attentiveness measure. For the second analysis, this
engagement variable was the (recoded) centered distractedness measure. For the third analysis,
this engagement variable was the sum of the centered distractedness measure and the centered
attentiveness measure. Results of these analyses are presented in Appendices H through J.
Examination of the results of these analyses suggested that the engagement measure was
related to recall. Obviously, given the correlational results, one effect that occurred in all three
analyses was that higher engagement predicted better recall (Attentiveness: F(1, 524) = 24.63, p
< .001, ηp2 = .04, b = .02; Distractedness: F(1, 518) = 10.26, p = .001, ηp2 = .02, b = .01; Index of
Attentiveness and Distractedness: F(1, 518) = 20.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, b = .01, with differences
in df due to missing values for Distractedness). A second result that emerged from all three
analyses was that the size of the recall difference between central trait behaviors and peripheral
trait behaviors was related to engagement (Attentiveness: F(1, 524) = 19.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .04,
b = .02; Distractedness: F(1, 518) = 10.93, p = .001, ηp2 = .02, b = .01, Index of Attentiveness
and Distractedness: F(1, 518) = 18.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, b = .01). In all cases, more
engagement led to a higher central behavior minus peripheral behavior difference score (see
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Figure 3).

Figure 3. Association Between Engagement Measures and Differential Recall of Central Minus
Peripheral Trait Behaviors.

Three other effects of interest emerged from these analyses. The first effect of interest is
that, regardless of the engagement measure used, the addition of an engagement rating to the
model slightly weakened the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction (a
signature of mnemic neglect) that was observed from the emerged the ANOVA reported earlier.
In fact, in the regression models this interaction effect was trending, but was nonsignificant, for
all three engagement ratings (Attentiveness: p = .06, Distractedness: p = .07, Index: p = .07).
While the engagement measures were originally thought of as a way to control for nuisance
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variables (e.g., the potentially messy distractions in the real-world environments in which
internet participants completed the study), these measures may instead partially reflect a
psychological process (engagement) that is important to mnemic neglect. In regression models,
when a variable is added to a model and an effect goes away, it is possible that the effect added
serves as a psychological mediator for the effect that dissipated. By this logic, the results of the
regression models hint at the possibility that psychological engagement may be a mediator of
mnemic neglect. However, I strongly caution that this is only a possibility. Study 1 was not
designed to be a test of whether engagement mediates the mnemic neglect effect. Hence, I raise
this idea only because it was suggested by the data; the worth of the idea needs to be verified in
future research.
The second additional effect of interest that emerged from the engagement analyses
potentially fits the original reason for conducting the engagement analysis, hinting at the
possibility that the goal priming manipulation actually worked when all main effects and
interaction effects including the attentiveness measure were accounted for. However, extreme
caution in interpreting this effect is warranted because the Trait Type × Behavior Valence ×
Behavior Referent × Condition interaction that tests this moderation only approached
significance (Attentiveness: F(1, 1544) = 2.43, p = .09, ηp2 = .003; Distractedness: F(1, 1526) =
2.06, p = .13, ηp2 = .003; Index: F(1, 1526) = 2.21, p = .11, ηp2 = .003). Further examination of
this interaction effect suggested that pattern observed in the decomposition of the original
ANOVA described above (Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction
effect significant in only the promotion focus condition) was also evident here (Control
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Condition: p = .74; Prevention Focus Condition: p = .34; Promotion Focus Condition: F(1, 112)
= 6.69, p = .01, ηp2 = .06).
The third additional effect of interest that emerged from the engagement analyses hinted
at the possibility that the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction (a
signature of mnemic neglect) was moderated by the engagement measure formed by summing
the two individual measures. However, extreme caution in interpreting this effect is warranted
because the Index × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect that
tests this moderation only approached significance, F(1, 1526) = 3.10, p = .08, ηp2 = .002.
However, further examination of this interaction effect showed that regardless of the order of the
decomposition, all effects were non-significant, e.g., when the Index × Behavior Valence ×
Behavior Referent was considered for recall of peripheral behaviors (p = .70) and for central
behaviors (p = .13).

Evaluation of Possible Moderation of Mnemic Neglect by Trait-Level Measures of Regulatory
Focus
The next set of analyses evaluated the relation between the measured trait-level variables
of promotion focus and prevention focus (as assessed by the RFQ) and mnemic neglect. These
analyses were conducted in a manner similar to that employed by Zengel and colleagues (2015).
After centering the continuous variables, a pooled within-subjects hierarchical regression was
conducted. These analyses all included the 3 (Priming Condition: promotion focus vs.
prevention focus vs. control) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence:
positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) design that was examined in the
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ANOVA described earlier in this dissertation, but added to these variables either the promotion
focus measure (as well as all interactions with other variables), the prevention focus measure (as
well as all interactions with other variables), or both the prevention focus measure and the
promotion focus measure (as well as all applicable interactions). Results from all three analyses
appear in Appendices K-M. Because many of the effects in the model duplicate those depicted
in the ANOVA, this presentation focuses on those effects containing the promotion focus
variable (in Table 4) and those containing the prevention focus variable (Table 5).

Table 4
Effects of Promotion Focus in Within-Subjects Hierarchical Regression for Study 1
Effect

F

p

Promotion × Trait Type

0.43

.513

Promotion × Behavior Valence

1.78

.182

Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.21

.649

Promotion × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.01

.919

Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.13

.721

Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.25

.615

Results from the analysis that contained only the promotion focus variable were
uninformative. Most notably, neither Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
(p = .72) interaction effect nor the Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effect (p = .62) was significant. There was therefore no evidence that
prevention focus as individual difference variable moderated the mnemic neglect effect.
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Table 5
Effects of Prevention Focus in Within-Subjects Hierarchical Regression for Study 1
Effect

F

p

Prevention × Trait Type

1.76

.185

Prevention × Behavior Valence

4.59

.032

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.82

.364

Prevention × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.13

.721

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

2.90

.089

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.40

.237

Similarly, the results depicted in Table 5 show that the prevention focus measure did not
moderate the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction. However, the
Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence effect was significant, F(1, 1535) = 4.59, p = .03, ηp2 =
.003. Decomposing the effect shows that for recall of negative behaviors, there is no significant
effect for Prevention Focus (p = .64). However, increased prevention focus is associated with
increased recall of positive behaviors, F(1, 1026) = 7.13, p = .01, ηp2 = .01, b = .02. This effect
was not anticipated and seems to conflict with the idea that a prevention focus should selectively
influence sensitivity to negative stimuli, not positive stimuli (Higgins, 1997).
The analysis also yielded a Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence effect that
approached significance, F(1, 1531) = 2.90, p = .09, ηp2 = .002. Decomposing the effect shows
that the Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence interaction effect was not significant for
peripheral behaviors (p = .69) but was significant for central behaviors, F(1, 512) = 6.14, p = .01,
ηp2 = .01. Further decomposition shows that for recall of central negative behaviors there is no
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significant effect for prevention focus (p = .88), but for recall of central positive behaviors
increased prevention focus is associated with increased recall of central positive behaviors, F(1,
512) = 8.77, p = .003, ηp2 =.02, b = .03. Again, this effect was not anticipated and seems to
conflict with the idea that a prevention focus should selectively influence sensitivity to negative
stimuli, not positive stimuli (Higgins, 1997).
In the final analysis, rather than just entering one regulatory focus variable at a time into
the model, both regulatory focus variables were simultaneously entered into the model. This
allows for the possibility that the mnemic neglect effect might be moderated by the combination
of the promotion focus level and the prevention focus level that characterized each participant.
Additionally it is possible that the moderation effects of either promotion focus or prevention
focus on mnemic neglect may be evident only if the other regulatory focus variable is controlled
for.
Table 6 lists the all the model effects that contain the prevention focus variable, the
promotion focus variable, or both. These results show that when both promotion focus and
prevention focus are entered into the model, neither regulatory focus variable by itself moderated
the mnemic neglect effect; neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction nor the
Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent was moderated by either individual
difference variable. However, the interaction between the prevention focus variable and the
promotion focus variable did moderate the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent effect, F(1,
1519) = 4.48, p = .04, ηp2 = .003. Decomposing the effect showed that the Prevention Focus ×
Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence interaction effect was not significant for Self as behavior
referent (p = .58) but approached significance for the Chris as behavior referent, F(1, 851) =
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Table 6
Effects of Promotion Focus and/or Prevention Focus
in Within-Subjects Hierarchical Regression for Study 1
Effect

F

p

Prevention × Trait Type

1.56

.212

Prevention × Behavior Valence

3.91

.048

Promotion × Trait Type

0.23

.632

Promotion × Behavior Valence

1.11

.292

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.94

.333

Prevention × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.05

.819

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

2.78

.096

Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.42

.518

< 0.01

.944

0.02

.898

< 0.01

.974

Prevention × Promotion × Behavior Valence

1.16

.282

Prevention × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.98

.323

Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.19

.660

Prevention × Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.68

.055

Prevention × Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.59

.442

Prevention × Promotion × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.48

.035

Prevention × Promotion × Trait Type × Beh. Valence × Beh. Referent

0.14

.709

Promotion × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
Promotion × Trait Type × Behavior Valence
Prevention × Promotion × Trait Type

3.06, p = .08, ηp2 = .004. Further decomposition of this latter effect showed that the Prevention
Focus × Prevention Focus interaction effect was not significant for Chris-positive behaviors (p =
.84) but was significant for Chris-negative behaviors, F(1, 568) = 4.00, p = .046, ηp2 = .007.
Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the latter interaction effect. An additional
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decomposition of the Prevention Focus × Prevention Focus interaction effect in the Chris
condition was conducted using Model 1 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2009) to
determine the Johnson-Newman significance region. For this purpose the variables were recentered for the Chris-referent part of the sample. The analysis revealed that the effect of
promotion focus on recall of Chris-referent negative behaviors was significant for prevention
focus values of -.6521 and below (23.51% of the region). However, because this interaction
occurred in the Chris condition, it is probably of limited importance to the processes that produce
mnemic neglect.

Figure 4. Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus Interaction for Recall of Chris-Referent
Central Negative Behaviors.
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Discussion

Using a standard mnemic neglect methodology and a sample of participants obtained
from Mechanical Turk, the results of Study 1 revealed a pattern that closely replicates patterns
observed in previous mnemic neglect studies. Most importantly, when behaviors pertained to
important trait dimensions, recall was especially poor for those behaviors when they were both
negative and framed as if they were enacted by the participant (i.e., self-framed).
Study 1 aimed to find evidence for moderation of the Trait Type × Behavior Valence ×
Behavior Referent interaction effect by regulatory focus. This search was rooted in the idea that
people in a prevention focus might be especially sensitive to negative stimuli. It was thought
that this sensitivity might be especially likely to produce poor memory for self-framed behaviors.
A second implication of regulatory focus theory is that a promotion focus might cause people to
be especially attuned to self-focused positive information, enhancing recall for such positive
information. I pursued one of these ideas by looking for evidence that the recall for self-framed
negative information might be influenced by either a priming manipulation designed to induce a
prevention focus or was related to a trait-level measure of an individual’s prevention focus level.
Similarly, I pursued the second of these ideas by looking for evidence that the recall for selfframed positive information might be influenced by either a priming manipulation designed to
induce a promotion focus or was related to a trait-level measure of an individual’s promotion
focus level.
The results, though not entirely clear-cut, seem to best reflect the idea that regulatory
focus is not strongly related to reduced memory for important self-relevant negative information.
Analysis results suggested that the regulatory focus manipulation did not moderate the “classic”

36
Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect that has often emerged in
studies of mnemic neglect. This suggests that the pattern of means that emerged across the
regulatory focus conditions was statistically equivalent.
However, separate examination of the data within each regulatory focus condition
showed that the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect emerged
as significant only in the promotion focus priming condition. The means for the data obtained in
the prevention focus condition and in the control condition resembled the means obtained in the
promotion focus condition (hence, the emergence of the significant Trait Type × Behavior
Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect collapsing across priming condition), but the
analysis results in those two conditions yielded main effects for referent (Chris behaviors were
recalled better than self behaviors), trait type (central behaviors were recalled better than
peripheral behaviors) and valence (positive behaviors were recalled better than negative
behaviors). I will admit to being a bit unsettled by these results. This was because I expected
the “classic” mnemic neglect results to emerge in the control condition and to vary from that
pattern in the goal priming conditions. This expectation about the pattern of data expected in the
control condition was especially strong given the large number of participants (300) who were
assigned to that condition. Nonetheless, the results of the overall ANOVA, which yielded a
significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect and did not
yield a significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent× Priming Condition
interaction effect, indicate that I should not make too much of the analysis results that differed
across the three priming conditions. That is, at this point, the best conclusion from the data
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seems to be that people evinced reduced recall for negative behaviors that were self-framed (as
opposed to Chris-framed) and that were relevant to important trait dimensions.
The study was also designed so that I could validly explore whether trait-level regulatory
focus affected recall in the mnemic neglect paradigm. My original intent was to explore this
question in the context of the control condition, which was why the sample size in that condition
was greater than in the other two priming conditions. However, given that the priming
manipulation did not seem to influence memory in the mnemic neglect task (as seen in Appendix
E, no significant effects involving the priming manipulation emerged from the main ANOVA),
to enhance statistical power I decided to search for trait-level effects using the data from all three
priming conditions.
Here again, the results of the analyses did not point to substantial relations between
regulatory focus and recall. Analysis results did suggest that increased prevention focus was
associated with increased recall of positive behaviors. However, this effect was not anticipated,
and conflicts with the idea that a prevention focus should selectively influence sensitivity to
negative stimuli, not positive stimuli (Hypothesis 2). Hence, this result should be viewed with
caution. Similarly, the analyses yielded a Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Behavior
Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect. However, decomposition of the interaction
effect suggested that the Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus effects were centered on Chrisframed behaviors, not on the self-framed behaviors. Here again, because this is an unanticipated
higher order interaction effect that does not seem to be grounded in theory, I suggest that one use
considerable caution when interpreting the result.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

Cognitive Mechanisms for Mnemic Neglect

Investigations into the mnemic neglect effect have gone beyond exploring moderators.
Efforts have also been made to determine the cognitive mechanisms that underlie mnemic
neglect. Results of several studies show that the mnemic neglect effect only occurs when people
have sufficient processing time (Sedikides & Green, 2000, Study 3), when the behaviors are
highly diagnostic of self-aspects (Green & Sedikides, 2004), and when the behaviors are
believed to be based on unmalleable traits (Green et al., 2005). It has also been found that
mnemic neglect is not based on a retrieval bias for positive behaviors (Sedikides & Green, 2000,
Study 4) or information inconsistency (Sedikides & Green, 2004). The assumption that self
central negative behavior might be more shallowly processed and thus less readily recalled than
self-central positive behavior also found support from a study by Pinter, Green, Sedikides, and
Gregg (2011). Participants were asked to either integrate themselves or separate themselves
from self-referent information (the Chris condition was dropped for Pinter et al., 2011). Overall
separation instructions lead to diminished recall while integration instructions lead to increased
recall. More important is that, in accordance with the idea that because of the way information is
encoded, self-threatening information would link to fewer retrieval routes than non-threatening
information; the integration instruction for central negative information was less effective than
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the separation instruction for central-positive information.
All these findings assume that the processes that cause the mnemic neglect effect
exclusively operate during the encoding phase of processing the feedback behaviors. However,
to my knowledge, this assumption has not been tested empirically. The second study in this
dissertation proposes to do so by manipulating when instructions that alter self-relevant
information processing are encountered: prior to encountering the behavioral stimuli or after
encountering the behavioral stimuli. The standard explanations for the mnemic neglect effect
suggest that manipulations should only be effective in altering mnemic neglect when such
manipulations alter how participants encode the feedback. This can only happen when
instructions alter processing prior to reading the feedback behaviors. However, it is possible that
when manipulated after reading the behaviors, processing-altering instructions may modify the
cues that participants use or the strategies that participants use when engaging in a memory
search. Obtaining such results would challenge the standard encoding-focused explanations for
mnemic neglect effects.

Overview

The goal of the second study was to confirm (or disconfirm) that the cognitive processes
behind the mnemic neglect effect are based on effects that occur during encoding and not on
effects that might occur during recall. To this purpose, a goal priming manipulation was
employed either prior to encoding (pre-encoding condition) or prior to recall (post-encoding
condition) while no priming was used in the control condition. If prior reasoning about mnemic
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neglect is accurate, it was expected that only the former and not the latter manipulation should
influence the mnemic neglect effect.
Because priming with regulatory focus (in particular prevention focus) in Study 1 was not
successful, an established manipulation that is thought to prime self-improvement strivings and
that moderates mnemic neglect was used instead (Green et al., 2009; see Appendix N).

Hypotheses

(1) Negative central self-referent behavior will be recalled less well than negative Chris-referent
behaviors (replication of mnemic neglect effect).
(2) Compared to the control condition, recall of negative central self-referent behaviors will be
affected in the pre-encoding condition (replication of priming effect on mnemic neglect).
(3) Compared to the post-encoding condition, recall of negative central self-referent behaviors
will be affected in the pre-encoding condition (mnemic neglect specific to encoding phase)
(4) If current reasoning about the mnemic neglect effect is not accurate, it is expected that
compared to the control condition, recall of negative central self-referent behaviors will be
affected in the post-encoding condition (mnemic neglect not specific to encoding phase).
(5) Alternatively, the above hypothesized effect might not be specific to the central traits but
may be demonstrated regardless of trait type.
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Method

Participants
Participants were again recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Based on the
power analyses conducted for Study 1, 3 × 150 = 450 participants were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and received 50 cents for their participation. As in Study 1, more
participants started the study than were recruited and paid. The following criteria were used to
exclude participants from the analysis: (a) none of the displayed behaviors were remembered
(160; among those 111 also did not complete the study), (b) non-native English speakers (16), (c)
participants were named Chris and were in the Chris condition (6), and (d) note taking during
behavior display (5). After these exclusions a total of 402 participants remained. They ranged in
age from 18 to 70 (M = 35.10, SD = 13.09), were predominantly female (64.4% with four
selecting other and one skipping the question), and predominately Caucasian (75.4%; African
American: 9.5%; Hispanic: 5.0%; Asian: 3.5%; Native American: 0.7%; bi or multi racial: 2.7%;
other: 2.7%; 0.5% missing).

Materials and Procedure

The materials and the procedure for Study 2 were identical to Study 1 with three
exceptions: (1) regulatory focus was not assessed as an individual difference measure; (2) only
one type of priming (for self-improvement strivings) was used in the study; and (3) depending on
condition, the priming took place either prior to the mnemic neglect paradigm (as was the case in
Study 1) or was used post-behavior encoding instead of the distractor task. To keep the amount
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of time spent between encoding and recall the same, participants had four minutes to complete
the priming task regardless if it was used before or after the display of the behaviors. The time
for the task (and thus also the distracter task) had been increased to allow for a reasonable
amount of time to complete the task. The priming task consisted of a supposed language fluency
task (Green et al., 2009). In this task, participants were asked to form 16 grammatically correct
sentences by using and reordering all but one word provided to them for each sentence (see
Appendix N). Many of the completed sentences in this task could be completed so that they
referred to improvement (e.g., “We are doing better.” “Terry has high aspirations.”).

Results

Memory Coding and Data Cleaning

The coding of the recalled behaviors was done in the same manner as described in Study
1. Rater agreement was 97.34%. As in Study 1, participants (8) with more than three intrusions
were again excluded from the data set. Additionally, the criterion established in Study 1 of
excluding participants with an attentiveness rating to the behavior display of 3 or less was again
used. This resulted in the exclusion of five more participants from Study 2. In Study 2 this
criterion was more than two standard deviations below the attentiveness mean (M = 4.95, SD =
0.94). The attentiveness frequency distribution appears in Figure 5.
To ensure that the priming manipulation could work ideally, 16 of the priming sentences
should have been completed in a way that included the word that primed the improvement
construct. However, insisting on perfect completion would have led to the exclusion of 163
participants. Based on the shape of the sentence completion distribution (see Figure 6), the a
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Figure 5. Frequency of Attentiveness Ratings in Study 2.

Figure 6. Frequency of Number of Priming Sentences Correctly Completed.
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priori exclusion criterion was therefore relaxed to include participants completing 14 or more
sentences, which led to the exclusion of 89 participants. This decision, which may seem to some
to be overly aggressive, was driven by the desire to make sure that included participants were
maximally exposed to the priming manipulation. However, the decision does not appear to have
influenced analysis results. Results from analyses with a less extreme two standard deviation
derived cutpoint (excluding those who completed five or fewer) produced results that were
highly similar to the results reported below.
The exclusion of additional participants in the two priming conditions because of failure
to adequately complete the priming task also meant that the control condition sample size was
larger (n = 132) than the sample size in the pre-encoding condition (n = 82) and the sample size
in the post-encoding conditions (n = .86). However, the standard deviation for the recall
dependent measure within each condition was about the same (control: .12, pre-encoding: .12,
post-encoding: .11). Moreover, the additional exclusions based on attentiveness and sentence
completion rate could not be predicted by the behavior referent variable (p = .33), so these
exclusions were not selective and did not unduly bias the analysis results. After all exclusions, a
total of 300 participants contributed data to the analyses that are described in the section that
follows.

Overview of Analyses

One set of analyses was conducted to explore if and when an improvement priming
manipulation influenced the mnemic neglect effect. The proportion of behaviors recalled in each
of the eight within-participants cells of the design was the dependent measure in these analyses.
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The main omnibus analysis was a 3 (Condition: pre-encoding priming vs. post-encoding priming
vs. control) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2
(Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-methods ANOVA with condition and referent as betweensubjects variables.
A number of subsidiary analyses were also conducted. One set of subsidiary analyses
duplicated the strategy used in Study 1 and looked for evidence of the Trait Type × Valence ×
Referent interaction separately in each of the three instruction conditions. Because the pattern of
recall obtained in Study 2 differed slightly from the usual pattern obtained, a second set of
subsidiary analyses focused only on recall in the negative behavior conditions. A third set of
subsidiary analyses included only the pre-encoding priming condition and was conducted as a
replication of Green et al. (2009).

Main Omnibus Analysis Results

The expected result was an interaction effect involving all four variables in the design.
However, this effect did not emerge (p = .34; for full analysis results, see Appendix O; for fourway interaction means, see Table 7). A number of other significant effects did emerge (see
Table 8), but except for the condition main effect, interpretation of these effects are all qualified
by the interaction that is typical of mnemic neglect studies, a significant three-way interaction
effect between trait type, behavior valence and behavior referent, F(1, 294) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp2 =
.01. Decomposition of the interaction effect showed that the Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effect was not significant for peripheral traits (p =.30) but it was significant
for central traits, F(1, 298) = 4.74, p = .03, ηp2 = .02. Decomposition of this latter interaction
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effect showed that for central positive behaviors more Chris-referent (M = .31, SD = .18) than
self-referent (M = .31, SD = .25) behaviors were recalled, F(1, 298) = 8.76, p = .003, ηp2 = .03.
However, this tendency was even stronger for central negative behaviors (Chris: M = 32, SD =
19; self: M = .20. SD = .18), F(1, 298) = 28.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Thus, as in Study 1, evidence
for mnemic neglect emerged in that in the central trait condition people showed impaired recall
for negative behaviors when those behaviors were self-framed.
When interpreting this result, it is useful to note that it is not the case that the four-way
interaction effect was not significant because of an impotent priming manipulation. Instead, the
analysis revealed a main effect for condition, F(2, 294) = 4.03, p = .02, ηp2 = .01. Examination
of the means in Table 7 suggests that the effect of the manipulation was to raise recall rates
relative to the control condition. One way to confirm this is to compare the recall proportions in
the priming conditions combined to the recall proportion in the control condition. This
comparison was significant, F(1, 296) = 6.07, p = .01, ηp2 = .02. However, additional results
from simple contrast tests showed that the recall in the control condition (M = .17, SD = .12) was
only significantly poorer (p = .01) than recall in the post-encoding condition (M = .22, SD = .11).
Though recall in the pre-encoding condition (M = .19, SD = .12) was higher than recall in the
control condition, that difference was not significant (p = .23).
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Table 7
Recall Proportion and Standard Deviations per Condition in Study 2
Control Condition
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.21 (.18)

.17 (.16)

.07 (.12)

.05 (.10)

Chris-referent

.28 (.19)

.31 (.19)

.13 (.13)

.10 (.13)

Referent

Priming Prior to Encoding
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.28 (.19)

.22 (.21)

.12 (.14)

.08 (.12)

Chris-referent

.32 (.18)

.26 (.19)

.12 (.11)

.08 (.10)

Referent

Priming After Encoding
Central behaviors

Peripheral behaviors

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Self-referent

.26 (.22)

.23 (.15)

.14 (.17)

.10 (.15)

Chris-referent

.34 (.17)

.37 (.17)

.16 (.14)

.09 (.10)

Referent
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Table 8
Significant Results of Omnibus ANOVA
Effect

F

p

Trait Type

372.31

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

13.31

< .001

Behavior Valence

24.87

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.27

.04

Behavior Referent

14.92

< .001

Condition

4.03

.02

Results of Subsidiary Analyses

Despite the non-significance of the four-way interaction effect, because this interaction
effect was the focus of Study 1, I examined the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent effect separately in each priming condition (for full results, see Appendices P through
R). The three-way interaction effect emerged for both the control condition (F(1, 130) = 4.41, p
= .04, ηp2 = .03) and trending for the post-encoding priming condition (F(1, 84) = 3.29, p = .07,
ηp2 = .04) but not for the pre-encoding priming condition (p = .96). This set of results provides
at least some suggestion that the three-way interaction effect that is typical of mnemic neglect
studies may have been reduced by the pre-behavior encoding priming manipulation.
This impression is further enhanced by the results of the analysis that included only the
pre-encoding and control conditions. A 2 (Trait Type: central, peripheral) × 2 (Behavior
Valence: positive negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self, Chris) × 2 (Condition: control, preencoding) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with behavior referent and condition as
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between-subjects variables. The expected result was a four-way interaction effect between all
included variables; such a result would replicate the result reported by Green et al. (2009).
Full results from this analysis appear in Appendix S. The four-way interaction effect of
interest was not significant (p = .20). Instead, the analysis results revealed that a number of other
main effects and interaction effects were significant. Decomposition of the Behavior Referent ×
Condition interaction effect (F(1, 210) = 3.94, p = .048, ηp2 = .02, showed in the priming before
encoding condition no significant difference in overall recall proportions for self-referent as
compared to Chris-referent behaviors (p = .52), but more Chris-referent as compared to selfreferent behaviors were recalled in the control condition, F(1, 84) = 17.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.
Decomposition of the Behavior Valence × Condition interaction effect (F(1, 210) = 4.26, p = .04,
ηp2 = .02) showed a trend to recall more positive than negative behaviors in the control condition,
F(1, 131) = 3.78, p = .05, ηp2 = .03, and significantly better recall of positive than negative
behaviors in the priming before encoding condition, F(1, 81) = 18.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .18.
Decomposition of the Trait Type × Behavior Referent interaction effect (F(1, 210) = 4.39, p =
.04, ηp2 = .02) showed that Chris-referent behaviors were recalled more often than self-referent
behaviors and that this pattern was present for peripheral traits (F(1,212) = 5.95, p = .02, ηp2 =
.03) but even more so for central traits (F(1, 212) = 12.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .06). Interpretations of
the significant main effects (which appear in Appendix S) were qualified by these interaction
effects.
However, because the main cell of interest in the design is recall for central-negative
behaviors, and changes in recall for peripheral behaviors and/or positive behaviors can obscure
the effect, a 2 (Behavior Referent: self, Chris) × 2 (Condition: pre-encoding, control) between-
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subjects ANOVA with central negative recall proportions as dependent variable was conducted.
The results showed that there was no significant effect for condition (p = .97) but that the main
effect for behavior referent was significant (Self: M = .19, SD = .18; Chris: M = .29, SD = .19;
F(1, 210) = 11.24, p = .001, ηp2 = .05). However, interpretation of this effect needs to be made
in the context of the significant and expected Behavior Referent × Condition interaction effect
(F(1, 210) = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 = .02). Decomposition of this interaction effect showed that, as
expected, there was no significant difference in recall between self-referent and Chris-referent
behaviors for central negative behaviors in the priming before encoding condition (p = .43) but
that in the control condition more Chris-referent behaviors were recalled than self-referent
behaviors, F(1, 130) = 20.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Thus, though the four-way did not achieve the
.05 significance criterion, the overall pattern of results map onto the results reported by Green et
al. (2009), suggesting that a self-improvement striving instruction administered prior to behavior
exposure removes at least some of the tendency to forget important self-framed negative
behaviors.
However, examination of the means depicted in Table 7 suggests that this tendency may
also have emerged in the post-exposure condition. While the central/self/negative recall
proportion in the control condition was .17 and was .22 in the prior-to-behavior condition, it was
.23 in the post-behavior exposure condition. This pattern suggests that perhaps the priming
condition had an impact on the recall of negative behaviors, regardless of whether the priming
occurred before behavior exposure or after behavior exposure. However, this interpretation is
clouded by the fact that the instruction manipulation generally increased recall. Hence, these
differences in means might have simply been a consequence of the general effects of the goal
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priming instruction on recall. Indeed, results of an analysis in which the two instruction
conditions were combined into a single condition failed to yield a four-way interaction effect (p
= .55), suggesting that the increase in the recall means in the priming/negative/central/self
condition was simply the result of the tendency of the instruction manipulation to increase recall.
Finally, in the context of prior mnemic neglect research, the results for Study 2 were a bit
unusual in that they reveal relatively low recall for central trait dimension self-framed positive
behaviors (relative to central trait dimension Chris-framed positive behaviors), an effect that is
not typical for mnemic neglect studies.
Given that the mnemic neglect hypothesis focuses on recall for self central negative
behaviors, I therefore conducted yet another analysis. This analysis concentrated on the recall of
central negative behaviors. This analysis was a 2 (Behavior Referent: self, Chris) × 2 (Priming
Condition: pre-encoding, post-encoding) between-subjects ANOVA with recall of central
negative behaviors as the dependent variable. The expected Behavior Referent × Priming
Condition interaction effect was trending, F(1, 164) = 3.28, p = .07, ηp2 = .02, and informed the
significant main effects for Priming Condition (Pre-encoding: M = .24, SD = .20; Post-encoding:
M = .31, SD = .18; F(1, 164) = 4.50, p = .04, ηp2 = .03) and Behavior Referent (Self: M = .22, SD
= .19, Chris: M = .32, SD = .19; F(1, 164) = 9.32, p = .003, ηp2 = .05). Decomposing the
interaction effect for the post-encoding priming condition showed that recall for self-referent
central negative behaviors (M = .23, SD = .15) was significantly reduced compared to recall for
Chris-referent central negative behaviors (M = .37, SD = .17), F(1, 84) = 14.77, p < .001, ηp2 =
.15. This pattern did not emerge in the pre-encoding priming condition (p = .43).
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Discussion

Study 2 tried to see if a manipulation thought to prime the self-improvement motive
moderated the mnemic neglect effect by improving recall for self-framed negative behaviors that
pertained to central trait dimensions (an effect that would replicate the results reported by Green
et al., 2009). It also tried to see if this same manipulation improved recall for such behaviors
when the priming manipulation was encountered after behavior exposure. Emergence of this
latter effect would leave open the possibility that mnemic neglect is caused by selectivity in
memory search and retrieval processes, which is not currently part of theorizing about the mental
processes that underlie mnemic neglect.
The data from Study 2 were not entirely clear-cut, but on balance they seem to favor the
encoding interpretation. Though results from an omnibus ANOVA indicated that the Trait Type
× Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect was not significantly moderated by
the priming manipulation, results from subsidiary analyses suggested that this three-way
interaction effect was significant in the control condition and in the post-encoding condition, but
not in the pre-encoding condition. Results from analyses that focused only on recall of central
negative behaviors suggested that the priming manipulation did improve recall for self-framed
behaviors that were relevant to central trait dimensions, but only when the priming manipulation
occurred before exposure to the behaviors.
Interestingly, despite being unable to moderate the mnemic neglect effect, the postencoding priming manipulation was not ineffectual. It produced an alteration in recall by
generally raising recall rates across conditions (the pre-encoding priming manipulation did the
same thing). This suggests that priming the self-improvement motive may have prompted
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participants to try harder during recall, which enhanced recall. However, if this interpretation
holds, it is notable that this effort increase alone is thus likely not responsible for the reduction in
mnemic neglect that likely emerged in the pre-encoding priming condition. Because priming
increased recall in both the pre-exposure and post-exposure conditions, but the reduction in
mnemic neglect was specific to the pre-exposure condition, increased effort at recall cannot
explain the reduction in mnemic neglect observed in the pre-exposure condition.
However, I emphasize that the conclusions that I offer in this discussion are only
tentative. While the basic mnemic neglect effect was significant in Study 2, moderation of that
effect did not appear in the omnibus analysis, but only in the subsidiary analyses. Thus, I would
encourage replication of this study with a larger sample size, perhaps doubling the sample size.
While my original plan used a sample size that I believed to be adequate, that may not have been
the case. Participant attrition rates, which are normally high in mnemic neglect studies to begin
with, were even higher in my research because I implemented it on the internet. This produced
additional subject loss because of failure to complete the study or because of inattention to the
behaviors. With a full sample of fully engaged participants, many of the interaction effects that
were merely trending in the main analyses may have been statistically reliable.
In addition, interpretation of the data from Study 2 was complicated by the fact that recall
for self-framed items was generally poor relative to recall for Chris-framed items. Further
examination of the data suggested that it was a bit anomalous in that there was relatively low
recall for self-referent central positive behaviors. The presence of this effect might have
obscured the effects of the priming manipulation on the omnibus ANOVA. Given that this
pattern does not emerge in typical mnemic neglect research, nor did it emerge in Study 1 (which
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also used an internet-provided participant sample and implemented the mnemic neglect method
on the internet), the best conclusion may be that this effect was simply a random aberration.
This possibility also leads to the conclusion that a replication of Study 2 is warranted.
What should not be overlooked is that, despite the abnormally low recall rates for selfframed positive information that emerged in Study 2, the data in Study 2 again yielded evidence
that, relative to Chris-framed information that pertains to central trait dimensions, self-framed
negative information that pertains to central trait dimensions is poorly recalled. More simply
stated, the data from Study 2 again yielded evidence of mnemic neglect. This study (as well as
Study 1) did so despite the use of the internet-derived sample and despite the lack of control that
supposedly accompanies the implementation of experimental procedures in internet contexts. It
is true that in both Studies 1 and 2 the mnemic neglect effect may have occurred only after
rigorous screening of data to eliminate inattentive or multitasking participants. Nonetheless, the
results from both Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that the psychological mechanisms activated in
the basic mnemic neglect paradigm are powerful enough to work, even when taken out of the
laboratory and placed in the less than pristine context of an individual working on the internet in
a location of their choosing.

CHAPTER 4

DOES MNEMIC NEGLECT EMERGE FOR BOTH SOCIAL/MORALITY AND
COMPETENCE?

The fact that mnemic neglect can emerge in an internet context is comforting and attests
to the power of the basic paradigm. However, one of the criticisms that can be leveled against
mnemic neglect research is that it is too dependent on that basic paradigm. Obviously, it is
undesirable for an area to offer general conclusions about self-motivations, cognitive processes,
and memory from research that relies on a single, and very specific, paradigm. Indeed, research
has already demonstrated that varying elements of the paradigm can moderate or eliminate the
mnemic neglect effect. As I previously noted, some research suggests that mnemic neglect does
not occur when memory is assessed via recognition instead of via free recall (Green et al., 2008;
Zengel, Wells, & Skowronski, 2016). Additional research suggests that the emergence of the
mnemic neglect effect depends on the exact manner in which free recall is assessed (Newman et
al., 2014).
However, while researchers have looked at the extent to which mnemic neglect is
dependent on the method used to assess recall, to my knowledge very few have looked at the
extent to which the effect is dependent on the types of behaviors to be remembered. Most
existing mnemic neglect research (an exception is Zengel et al., 2015) has used the exact
behaviors and trait dimensions that were developed and pretested by Sedikides and Green
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(2000). These behaviors and trait dimensions (such as trustworthy/untrustworthy and
modest/immodest) all link to the social/moral elements of an individual. From the perspective of
social psychology, this focus on sociality only reflects part of the human experience. A second
major component of human traits lies in competence/incompetence. Indeed, early factor
analyses of human traits impressions concluded that the two main dimensions of meaning that
underlie human traits are the dimensions of good/social vs. bad/social and good/intellectual vs.
bad/intellectual (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekanathan, 1968). Similarly, some social
psychologists make a distinction between traits that relate to competence (smart/dumb) versus
those (trustworthy/untrustworthy) that relate to morality (Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Wojciszke.
1997, 2005; Wojciszke, Dowhyluk, & Jaworski, 1998).
While the mnemic neglect effect has been demonstrated repeatedly for the social/morality
traits used in the basic mnemic neglect paradigm (and which I used in Studies 1 and 2), it has not
yet been explored for traits that are in the competence domain. This is an important insight
because it is possible that effects that emerge on trait dimensions that link to competence and on
traits that link to morality may differ in several ways. For example, one might expect that
failures on competence-related traits might produce different negative emotions (disappointment)
than failures on morality-related traits (guilt). One might hypothesize that people may be more
motivated to avoid guilt than disappointment, which leads to the notion that mnemic neglect may
be bigger for social trait dimension failures than for competence trait dimension failures.
However, there is an opposite view. Some theorizing suggests that competence traits seem to be
those traits that are desired more for the self than for others, while morality traits are desired
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more in others than in the self (Wojciszke et al., 1998). This suggests that competence failures
may be more self-threatening than morality failures.
Moreover, one somewhat curious outcome of the mnemic neglect paradigm is that it
shows evidence of self-protection (via the reduced recall of negative central self-referent
information) but not of self-enhancement (via increased recall of positive central self-referent
information). It is possible that the self-enhancement effect might emerge for competence traits,
especially given the Wojciszke et al. (1998) results suggesting that such traits are more desired
for the self rather than in others.
Given these ideas, it seemed important to see if mnemic neglect effects emerged for
competence traits as well as for morality traits. However, conducting such a study required that
competence stimuli be developed so that they could be used in the mnemic neglect paradigm.
The section that follows describes the process that I used to develop new stimuli and the outcome
of that development process.

Pretest Goals and Methods

My goal for Study 3 was to use a design that presented to participants both behaviors
related to social/morality traits and behaviors related to competence traits and that each of these
trait classes was represented by one central trait and one peripheral trait. Accomplishing this
required that: (1) one of the new competence traits was central, the other peripheral (Pretest 1);
(2) following Sedikides and Green (2000), the new central behaviors and peripheral behaviors
generated for the new traits were distinct in regards to both importance to perform/not perform
and valence (Pretest 2); (3) the new competence behaviors were descriptive of the intended traits
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and were about as equally descriptive of their traits as the morality behaviors were descriptive of
their traits; and (4) all behaviors were more descriptive of the intended traits than of the other
traits used in the paradigm (behaviors based on morality traits in Pretest 1 and behaviors based
on competence traits in Pretest 2).
I pursued these goals by conducting several pretests. The procedures used for these
pretests were modeled on the methods used in the pretests conducted by Sedikides and Green
(2000). The goal was to obtain a total of 32 behaviors; eight behaviors per trait (four positive,
four negative). Half of these behaviors (the ones in the morality domain) were obtained from
previously conducted mnemic neglect studies; I borrowed other behaviors for the pretest (the
ones in the competence domain) from existing sources or generated new behaviors myself.

Pretesting Focusing on Traits and Trait-Behavior Relations: Pretest 1 and Pretest 2

Participants

Participants for the pretests were recruited through MTurk and paid between 25 and 50
cents for their time. The surveys were hosted on Surveymonkey.com. Participants who did not
complete the survey or who failed to answer the control questions (e.g. “For this item please
select that not performing the behavior is extremely important to you.”) were excluded from data
analyses. Each participant started the study by reading the consent form and indicating consent
by proceeding to the next page.
In the first pretest, 51 valid responses from MTurk participants were recorded.
Participants ranged in age from 19 to 74 years (M = 35.37, SD = 13.73). Both sexes were about

59
equally represented, with 28 females (54.9%) and 23 males (45.1%). Most participants were
Caucasian (80.4%). The remaining participants were African American (5.9%), Asian American
(5.9%), Hispanic (5.9%), or identified as mixed (2.0%).
In the second pretest, 70 valid responses from MTurk participants were recorded.
Participants ranged in age from 19 to 61 years (M = 37.66, SD = 12.44). Both sexes were again
about equally represented, with 37 females (52.9%) and 32 males (45.7%). One person skipped
the gender question. Most participants were also Caucasian (75.7%), with African Americans
(4.3%), Asian Americans (8.6%), Hispanic (4.3%), mixed (5.7%) and others (1.4%) also
represented.

Materials

The traits for Pretest 1 were selected based on materials used by Abele and Wojciszke
(2007). Their examination of 300 traits confirmed that, on an 11-point rating scale from -5 to +5,
the traits trustworthy and modest received high ratings for morality (trustworthy: M = 3.20,
modest: M = 2.00; standard deviations unknown). Additionally, a thesaurus (www.
thesaurus.com) lists both the term “trustworthy” and “modest” as synonyms for moral. Both of
these traits had previously been used in the standard mnemic neglect paradigm (Sedikides &
Green, 2000).
To find traits that evinced similar characteristics in the competence domain, the dataset
from Abele and Wojciszke (2007) was consulted. It listed competent (M= 4.60) and meticulous
(M = 4.30) as traits that reflect the competence construct. To ensure that the selected traits
reflected different levels of centrality (competent = central and meticulous = peripheral), in a
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pretest the traits were included with other traits and were assessed in regard to: (1) how
descriptive each trait was for participants, (2) how important it was for participants to have each
trait, (3) how important it was that other people have each trait, (4) how positive or negative they
thought each trait was, (5) how upset participants would be if it was suggested that they
possessed the negative versions of each trait (i.e., untrustworthy, immodest, incompetent, sloppy)
and (6) how upset they were if someone else possessed the negative version of each trait. For
additional details, see Appendix T for the exact phrasing of the questions and response scales
used in the pretest.
Pretest 1 also assessed, for each trustworthy behavior and modest behavior from
Sedikides and Green (2000) and Green et al. (2008), how descriptive the behavior was of all the
traits included in the paradigm (trustworthy or untrustworthy, modest or immodest, competent or
incompetent, meticulous or sloppy). Additional behaviors from Green et al. (2008) were
included so that alternative behaviors would be available should a problem with the original
Sedikides and Green (2000) behaviors occur. The precise wording of the questions and the
response scales are included in Appendix U. Because all these behaviors had already been
pretested to ensure that they were descriptive of the intended traits and mapped on to the central
versus peripheral distinction, no other pretests were performed with these behaviors.
In Pretest 2 the behaviors that were generated to exemplify competent/incompetent and
meticulous/sloppy were evaluated regarding the importance to perform/not perform the behavior
and the valence of the behavior. Additionally, I assessed how informative the behaviors were of
the intended trait and how their descriptiveness compared to the other traits in the paradigm (see
Appendix U).

61
Pretest Results

Traits

Traits were first evaluated by combining the central traits (trustworthy and competent)
and the peripheral traits (modest and meticulous) through averaging of the individual ratings.
Paired sample t tests were performed to evaluate the differences between central traits and
peripheral traits. As expected, central rates (M = 6.62, SD = 1.37) were more self-descriptive
than peripheral traits (M = 5.10, SD = 1.51), t(50) = 7.16, p < .001, d = 1.00. Central traits were
also rated as more important for the self (M = 7.15, SD = 1.32) than peripheral traits (M = 5.50,
SD = 1.70), t(50) = 7.60, p < .001, d = 1.06. Additionally, central traits were also rated as more
important to others (M = 6.98, SD = 1.07) than peripheral traits (M=4.80, SD = 1.61), t(50) =
8.71, p < .001, d = 1.22. The difference in valence between the positivity of the positive trait and
the negativity of the negative trait showed the same pattern. The valence difference for central
traits (M = 6.53, SD = 2.00) was larger than for peripheral traits (M = 4.19, SD = 1.86), t(50) =
9.21, p < .001, d = 1.29. When the negative traits were considered, participants found it more
upsetting if it was suggested that they possessed negative central traits (M= 6.58, SD = 1.60) than
peripheral traits (M = 4.74, SD = 1.99), t(50) = 7.20, p < .001, d = 1.01. Similarly, participants
found it more upsetting if other people possessed negative central traits (M = 5.65, SD = 1.88)
than negative peripheral traits (M=3.66, SD = 1.91), t(50) = 7.50, p < .001, d = 1.05. The same
pattern could also be seen if the comparisons were made within the social/morality trait
dimension and within the competence trait dimension (see Table 9, Figure 7 and Figure 8).
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Table 9
Paired Samples T Tests Comparing Ratings of Trustworthy with Modest and Competent with
Meticulous
Rating Questions

Traits

How well do the following traits Trustworthy
describe you?
Modest
Competent
Meticulous
How important is it for you to
Trustworthy
have the following traits?
Modest
Competent
Meticulous
How important is it that other
Trustworthy
people are …?
Modest
Competent
Meticulous
Valence difference
Trustworthy
Modest
Competent
Meticulous
How upset would you be if
Untrustworthy
someone said you were …?
Immodest
Incompetent
Sloppy
How upset would you be if
Untrustworthy
someone else was …?
Immodest
Incompetent
Sloppy
Note: 9-point scale ranging from 0 to 8. See Appendix T.

M

SD

df

T

p

d

6.84
5.52
6.37
4.67
7.14
5.88
7.16
5.12
7.45
5.57
6.48
4.12
7.12
4.47
5.94
3.90
6.47
4.65
6.66
4.82
6.43
4.00
4.86
3.31

1.28
1.85
1.74
2.25
1.48
2.30
1.39
2.18
0.99
2.12
1.61
2.33
2.06
2.80
2.56
2.30
1.88
2.50
1.75
2.32
2.26
2.33
2.40
2.40

49

4.81

< .001

0.68

50

5.42

< .001

0.76

50

4.63

< .001

0.65

50

6.05

< .001

0.85

50

6.80

< .001

0.95

49

6.21

< .001

0.88

50

7.36

< .001

1.03

50

6.00

< .001

0.84

50

5.72

< .001

0.80

49

5.60

< .001

0.79

50

6.17

< .001

0.86

50

4.79

< .001

0.67
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Figure 7. Ratings of Positive Traits in Pretest 1.

Figure 8. Ratings of Negative Traits in Pretest 1.
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When self-ratings were compared with other ratings, the results, in particular for central
traits, resembled findings reported by Wojciszke et al. (1998) regarding the distinction between
social/morality traits and competence traits. Competence traits were found to be more important
for the self to possess rather than for others, while it was more important that other people
possess social/morality traits than for the self to possess them (see Table 10). Participants were
also more upset if it was suggested that they were incompetent or sloppy than they were at the
suggestion that other people possessed those traits. However, the expected pattern that
participants would be more upset about other people being immoral was not confirmed. They
were equally upset about self and others when it came to untrustworthiness and more upset if
they themselves were seen as immodest compared to others (see Table 11).

Table 10
Paired Samples T Tests Comparing Ratings About Importance to Possess Traits for Self with
Importance for Others to Possess the Trait
Self

Other

Trait

M

SD

M

SD

df

T

p

d

Trustworthy

7.14

1.48

7.45

0.99

50

-2.22

.03

0.31

Modest

5.88

2.30

5.57

2.12

50

1.47

.15

0.21

Competent

7.14

1.40

6.48

1.61

49

2.90

.01

0.41

Meticulous

5.12

2.18

4.04

2.37

50

3.56

<.01

0.50

Note: 9-point scale ranging from 0 to 8. See Appendix T.
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Table 11
Paired Samples T Tests Comparing Ratings About Upset Being Told to Have Negative Traits
Oneself Versus Upset Being Told That Someone Else Has Negative Traits
Self

Other

Trait

M

SD

M

SD

df

t

p

d

Untrustworthy
Immodest
Incompetent
Sloppy

6.47
4.65
6.66
4.82

1.88
2.50
1.75
2.30

6.43
4.00
4.86
3.31

2.26
2.33
2.42
2.40

50
50
49
50

0.16
1.84
4.95
4.49

.87
.07
<.01
<.01

0.02
0.26
0.70
0.63

Note: 9-point scale ranging from 0 to 8. See Appendix T.

Behaviors

The behavior descriptions for the traits trustworthy, untrustworthy, modest, and
immodest were taken from past research (e.g., Sedikides & Green, 2000).
Eight new behavior descriptions (four positive and four negative) were selected for the
traits competent and meticulous. These selections were made from examination of pretest ratings
(1) to perform or not perform the behavior, (2) behavior valence, and (3) behavior
descriptiveness for the intended trait. The behaviors had also been generated with the intention of
making them as different as possible from each other. The behaviors that were selected are listed
in Appendix V.
The ratings for the selected positive behaviors for each trait and the negative behaviors
for each trait were averaged to be able to compare collective ratings differences in importance to
perform/not perform the behavior and in valence with paired samples t tests.
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Competent behaviors (M = 2.97, SD = 0.84) were rated as more important to perform
than meticulous behaviors (M = 0.52, SD = 1.52), t(69) = 12.57, p < .001, d = 1.50. Incompetent
behaviors (M = -3.46, SD = 1.03) were rated as more important not to perform than sloppy
behaviors (M = -1.62, SD = 1.17), t(69) = -11.81, p < .001, d = 1.41. Additionally, competent
behaviors (M = 3.02, SD = 0.89) were rated as more positive than meticulous behaviors (M =
0.97, SD = 1.19), t(69) = 14.41, p < .001, d = 1.72. Similarly, incompetent behaviors (M = -3.11,
SD = 1.03) were rated as more negative than sloppy behaviors (M = -1.62, SD = 1.17), t(69) =
-11.33, p < .001, d = 1.35.
The selected new behaviors were also informative regarding their intended traits. These
descriptiveness ratings ranged from 4.61 to 7.33 on the 9-point scale from 0 to 8. The detailed
ratings are listed in Table 12.
To ensure that the selected behaviors were more descriptive of the intended trait than of
the other traits used in the paradigm, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted in which the
descriptiveness rating for each of the four trait dimensions was the independent variable. The
results of the contrast analyses that compared the ratings of the other traits to the rating of the
intended trait are presented below. For example, for a trustworthy behavior the ratings of how
descriptive the trait was of the traits modest, competent, and meticulous were each evaluated
against the descriptiveness for the trait trustworthy. Please note that the behaviors for
trustworthy and modest were evaluated in Pretest 1 while the behaviors for competent and
meticulous were evaluated in Pretest 2. The results of these contrast effects are listed in Table
13.
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Table 12
Descriptiveness Ratings for Competent Behaviors, Incompetent Behaviors, Meticulous
Behaviors, and Sloppy Behaviors
Behavior

N

M

SD

X would spot crucial mistakes in the work process and correct
them.

70

7.33

1.07

X would quickly learn to use new technologies.

69

7.07

1.28

X would always finish projects well before the deadline.

70

7.14

1.05

X would be hired for the well-paying job X applied for.

70

6.63

1.69

When X would cook a meal for friends, everyone would end up
in the hospital with food poisoning.

70

5.84

2.62

When X would be put in charge of a club’s finances, X would
mis-add the numbers in the club accounts and the club would go
bankrupt.

70

6.43

2.42

X would try to fix a leaky bathroom faucet and end up flooding
the whole house.

69

6.04

2.43

X would try to fix X’s car’s engine and blow up the car.

70

6.03

2.40

X would spell check X’s shopping lists.

70

6.83

1.83

X would iron clothing items before putting them into the closet.

70

6.60

1.70

X would pre-wash all dishes by hand before putting them into the
dishwasher.

69

6.41

1.87

Competent

Incompetent

Meticulous

(continued on next page)
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(Table 12 continued)

Behavior

N

M

SD

70

7.10

1.44

X would let weeds grow in X’s front yard.

69

4.61

2.37

After a meal X would always have crumbs or sauce around the
mouth.

68

5.46

2.29

X would often put CDs into whatever case came to hand
regardless of the label.

69

5.03

2.32

X would let dust accumulate on X’s furniture.

69

4.99

2.17

When X cut pieces of wood for a project, X would measure each
piece 4 times to ensure that they were exactly the same length.
Sloppy

Note: 9-point scale ranging from 0 to 8. See Appendix U.

As the untrustworthy behavior, “An employer would not rely on X to have an important
project completed by the deadline,” was equally descriptive for the trait trustworthy as for the
trait competent, the behavior was dropped and replaced with “X would not pay back money that
X owed to a friend” from Green et al. (2008). This was the only behavior in the morality trait
dimensions that needed to be replaced.
All traits and behaviors passed the requirements set by Sedikides and Green (2000).
Additionally, the difference between central traits and peripheral traits not only applies to selfratings of importance and upset but also to other ratings. The pretesting also ensured that all the
behaviors used are not only descriptive of the intended trait but are more descriptive of that trait
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than of any other trait used in the paradigm. The complete list of behaviors is included in
Appendix V.

Table 13
Contrasts of Repeated Measures ANOVAS
Comparing Descriptiveness Ratings of Each Behavior for Traits with Primarily Implied Trait
Behaviors

Trustworthy / Untrustworthy
M

SD

F

X would keep secrets when asked
to

5.24

1.44

-

X would follow through on a
promise made to friends

5.18

1.49

A teacher would leave X alone in
a room while taking a test and not
be afraid that X would cheat

2.04

People would be willing to tell X
embarrassing things about
themselves in confidence

p

Modest / Immodest

Competent / Incompetent

Meticulous / Sloppy

M

SD

F

p

M

SD

F

p

M

SD

F

p

-

2.49

2.20

53.13

<.01

2.98

2.15

40.06

<.01

1.53

1.88

96.59

<.01

-

-

2.04

2.20

67.10

<.01

3.65

1.98

32.29

<.01

1.96

1.98

80.73

<.01

1.77

-

-

1.69

2.03

66.11

<.01

3.20

2.31

27.01

<.01

1.65

1.91

72.24

<.01

4.92

1.75

-

-

2.53

2.08

33.30

<.01

2.65

2.10

41.99

<.01

1.24

1.75

88.18

<.01

X would borrow other people’s
belongings without their
knowledge

4.90

1.88

-

-

1.63

2.03

80.86

<.01

1.88

1.75

79.91

<.01

1.27

1.66

96.44

<.01

X would be unfaithful when in an
intimate relationship

5.04

1.87

-

-

2.43

2.16

53.83

<.01

2.08

1.82

80.43

<.01

1.43

1.86

96.45

<.01

X would often lie to X’s parents

4.98

1.64

-

-

1.98

2.12

90.71

<.01

2.16

2.02

62.09

<.01

1.27

1.74

101.04

<.01

An employer would not rely on X
to have an important project
completed by the deadline(*)

4.43

1.89

-

-

1.33

1.75

74.50

<.01

4.61

1.82

0.50

.48

2.80

2.08

26.81

<.01

Trustworthy (N=51)

Untrustworthy (N=51)

(continued on next page)
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(Table 13 continued)
X would not pay back money that
X owed to a friend(**)

5.00

1.81

-

-

1.61

2.11

85.26

<.01

2.01

2.30

45.02

<.01

1.82

1.96

81.06

<.01

X would take the focus off X and
redirect it to others

2.31

2.08

35.68

<.01

4.67

1.76

-

-

2.22

1.99

35.91

<.01

1.29

1.69

70.41

<.01

X would let some of X’s
achievements go by unaccredited

2.08

2.22

51.67

<.01

4.86

1.70

-

-

2.69

2.06

33.42

<.01

1.59

1.86

73.47

<.01

X would give others the credit for
a group success

3.14

2.18

26.65

<.01

5.00

1.59

-

-

2.73

2.25

41.21

<.01

1.69

1.95

78.44

<.01

X would never openly brag about
X’s accomplishments

2.35

2.09

48.87

<.01

5.00

1.59

-

-

1.88

1.83

72.20

<.01

1.00

1.34

130.77

<.01

X would act in a condescending
manner to other people

2.71

2.19

10.71

<.01

4.12

2.05

-

-

1.78

1.74

42.16

<.01

1.20

1.51

56.43

<.01

X would point out others’
weaknesses to make X look better

3.53

2.20

17.04

<.01

4.82

1.61

-

-

2.51

2.12

45.97

<.01

1.37

1.75

83.75

<.01

X would talk more about X than
about others

2.06

1.94

36.23

<.01

4.69

1.94

-

-

1.76

1.81

50.66

<.01

1.04

1.43

80.44

<.01

X would like to show off in front
of others

1.55

1.49

108.22

<.01

5.00

1.66

-

-

1.75

1.89

75.95

<.01

1.24

1.62

100.07

<.01

X would spot crucial mistakes in
the work process and correct them

4.41

1.88

12.11

<.01

2.06

2.30

89.94

<.01

5.21

1.38

-

-

2.06

2.30

30.23

.01

X would quickly learn to use new
technologies

1.47

1.94

176.68

<.01

1.36

1.84

206.32

<.01

4.94

1.41

-

-

2.01

2.04

132.50

<.01

X would always finish projects
well before the deadline

4.60

1.71

6.60

.01

1.80

2.09

151.98

<.01

5.11

1.30

-

-

3.83

2.01

35.60

<.01

X would be hired for the wellpaying job X applied for

3.66

2.09

32.12

<.01

2.13

2.11

120.74

<.01

4.99

1.37

-

-

2.53

2.05

102.19

<.01

Modest (N=51)

Immodest (N=51)

Competent (N=70)
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(continued on next page)

(Table 13 continued)
Incompetent (N=70)
When X would cook a meal for
friends, everyone would end up in
the hospital with food-poisoning

3.50

2.06

19.64

<.01

1.27

1.91

115.04

<.01

4.49

1.89

-

-

3.67

2.23

12.58

.01

When X would be put in charge of
a club’s finances, X would missadd the numbers in the club
accounts and the club would go
bankrupt

4.34

2.16

10.30

<.01

1.56

2.01

124.58

<.01

5.01

1.77

-

-

4.14

2.19

14.01

<.01

X would try to fix a leaky
bathroom faucet and end up
flooding the whole house

2.80

2.15

42.31

<.01

1.30

1.83

108.78

<.01

4.44

1.89

-

-

3.21

2.19

20.23

<.01

X would try to fix X’s car’s
engine and blow up the car

3.09

2.12

43.51

<.01

1.40

1.97

134.45

<.01

4.86

1.71

-

-

2.91

2.29

52.43

<.01

X would spell check X’s shopping
lists

1.47

1.89

104.28

<.01

1.29

1.78

111.30

<.01

2.43

2.12

56.87

<.01

4.51

1.92

-

-

X would iron clothing items
before putting them into the closet

1.16

1.69

178.99

<.01

1.76

2.04

109.69

<.01

2.36

2.07

96.17

<.01

4.87

1.57

-

-

X would pre-wash all dishes by
hand before putting them into the
dishwasher

1.51

2.01

131.08

<.01

1.44

1.95

139.71

<.01

2.34

2.11

83.55

<.01

4.94

1.47

-

-

When X cut pieces of wood for a
project, X would measure each
piece 4 times to ensure that they
were exactly the same length

2.61

2.16

66.69

<.01

1.39

1.93

146.89

<.01

3.79

1.88

24.83

<.01

5.04

1.57

-

-

0.93

1.48

127.95

<.01

1.27

1.52

101.55

<.01

1.77

1.90

77.48

<.01

3.94

1.85

-

-

Meticulous (N=70)

Sloppy (N=70)
X would let weeds grow in X’s
front yard

(continued on next page)
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(Table 13 continued)
After a meal X would always have
crumbs or sauce around the mouth

0.77

1.43

127.80

<.01

1.24

1.72

92.10

<.01

1.53

1.68

94.57

<.01

4.24

1.91

-

-

X would often put CDs into
whatever case came to hand
regardless of the label

1.57

1.79

88.06

<.01

0.96

1.54

120.02

<.01

2.13

2.05

58.11

<.01

4.17

1.92

-

-

X would let dust accumulate on
X’s furniture

0.99

1.54

125.17

<.01

1.29

1.57

108.36

<.01

1.87

1.86

83.20

<.01

4.01

1.77

-

-

Note: (*) original behavior pretested in Sedikides & Green (2000)

(**)

replacement behavior pretested in Green, Sedikides, and Gregg (2008)
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Study 3: Looking for Mnemic Neglect in Both
Social/Morality Behaviors and Competence Behaviors

Overview

The purpose of the third study was to replicate the mnemic neglect effect in the
social/morality domain and to see if the effect extended to the competence domain. To pursue
this goal, the mnemic neglect paradigm was expanded so that it contained both behaviors that
were linked to morality-relevant traits and behaviors that were linked to competence-relevant
traits.

Hypotheses

The memory data from Study 3 was examined for evidence of the following specific

effects:

(1) Negative central self-referent behaviors should be recalled more poorly than negative central
Chris-referent behaviors in the morality domain (replication of mnemic neglect effect in the
morality domain).
(2) Negative central self-referent behaviors will be recalled more poorly than negative central
Chris-referent behaviors in the competence domain (expansion of the mnemic neglect effect
to the competence domain).
(3) Positive central self-referent behaviors will be recalled better than positive central Chrisreferent behaviors (self-enhancement in the competence domain).
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(4) Reasoning from the data reported by Zengel et al. (2015), the above hypotheses might not be
specific to recall for behaviors implying central traits but also influence recall for behaviors
implying peripheral traits.

Method

Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The sample size goal
was based on the power analysis conducted for Study 1. To be conservative, 300 participants
were recruited. This recruitment pool doubles the number of participants indicated by the power
analysis to be necessary to detect desired effects. However, as the results turned out to be
unusual, the study was conducted twice (I will refer to these as data collection 1 and data
collection 2), each with the same 300 participant sample size.
The same exclusion criteria were used as in Studies 1 and 2. As with all Amazon
Mechanical Turk studies, more people start the study than actually complete it. This might be
akin to undergraduates reading the details of a study, signing up but then either dropping out of a
study or missing their appointment. The exclusion criteria and number of affected participants
are listed in Table 14.
In data collection 1, after deletions a total of 285 participants remained. Participants
ranged in age from 18 to 80 years of age (M = 35.01, SD = 12.36), were predominantly female
(63.4%, with one person indicating to be neither male nor female and three people skipping the
question), and predominantly Caucasian (73.2%; African American: 8.1%, Hispanic: 4.9%,
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Table 14
Exclusion Criteria in Study 3
Number of Excluded Participants
Exclusion Criteria

Data Collection 1

Data Collection 2

No behavior remembered and incomplete

51

75

No behavior remembered and complete

11

15

Non-English speakers

12

8

Named Chris in Chris condition

1

6

Note-taking during behavior display

2

3

Asian: 6.3%, Native American: 0.4%, multi-racial: 3.5%, other: 3.2% , 4% of participants
skipping the question).
In data collection 2, after deletions a total of 283 participants remained. Participants
ranged in age from 18 to 79 years of age (M = 33.98, SD = 12.32), were predominantly female
(68.2%), and predominantly Caucasian (76.7%; African American: 4.6%, Hispanic: 4.6%, Asian:
5.7%, Native American: 1.4%, multi-racial: 3.2%, other: 3.9%).

Materials and Procedure

The materials and the procedure were identical to those employed in the control condition
of Study 1 with one exception: the behaviors used in the paradigm were exchanged with those
developed and examined in the pretests (see Appendix V). Regulatory focus was also assessed
as an individual difference measure to allow for a replication of findings from Study 1 if the
results allowed for such a replication. However, my description of analyses for Study 3 focuses
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on the new aspect of Study 3: a comparison of recall data for morality-relevant behaviors to the
recall of data for competence-relevant behaviors.
Additionally, the second data collection contained a single scale item that was added for
exploratory purposes: “Based only on the behaviors and events presented in this study would you
perceive yourself [Chris] to be …” The 7-point scale ranged from -3 to 3 (anchors: -3 = Very
bad; 0 = Neither good nor bad; 3 = Very good). To my knowledge, how participants use the
behaviors presented to them to judge the target has not been explored in the context of mnemic
neglect studies.

Results

Memory Coding and Data Cleaning

The memory coding was conducted in the same way as for Studies 1 and 2. Rater
agreement for the first data collection was 96.08% and for the second data collection it was
97.65%. Disagreements were in both cases resolved through discussion. The correctly recalled
behaviors were converted into proportions of behaviors recalled/presented per cell of the withinsubjects design (Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence). Also, participants with four or more
intrusions were again excluded from the data analysis (data collection 1 = 3; data collection 2 =
1). Additionally, the same cutoff for attentiveness (data collection 1: M = 5.11, SD = 0.96; data
collection 2: M = 4.91, SD = 0.97) was used as in Study 1 and in Study 2. This decision was
made so that the cutoff would be consistent across studies.
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Figure 9. Frequency Distributions of Self-Rated Attentiveness During Behavior Display
in Data Collection 1 of Study 3.

Figure 10. Frequency Distributions of Self-Rated Attentiveness During Behavior Display
in Data Collection 2 of Study 3.
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The frequency distributions of the attentiveness rating can be seen in Figures 9 and 10.
The cutoff was two times the standard deviation below the respective mean (data collection 1:
5.11 - 2×0.96 = 3.19 > 2; data collection 2: 4.91 - 2×0.97 = 2.97 > 2). Consequently an
additional two participants were excluded from data collection 1 and additional four participants
were excluded from data collection 2. Due to the low numbers of additional exclusions based on
intrusions and attentiveness in Study 3, there was no concern that the exclusions could unduly
influence the results.

Overview of Analyses

An initial analysis examined recall for both social/morality behaviors and competence
behaviors. I expected to find evidence for mnemic neglect on both trait dimensions. I looked for
such evidence in both an omnibus analysis that simultaneously included recall data for both trait
dimensions and in analyses that examined recall separately for social/morality behaviors and
competence behaviors. I also theorized that there might also be evidence of self-enhancement
for central positive behaviors in the competence domain.
As the results actually did not confirm any of these predictions, a second data collection
was conducted. An initial analysis examined recall for both morality behaviors and competence
behaviors. Then, in a combined analysis the results of the first data collection and the second
data collection were compared to ensure that they replicated each other. Finally, to ensure that
there was a real change in the morality data results pattern between Study 2 and Study 3, the
social/morality domain data for data collection 2 was compared with the social/morality (i.e.,
trustworthy) domain data of the control condition in Study 2. Study 2 was chosen because here
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the control condition showed the clearest pattern of mnemic negect (the significant three-way
interaction effect between trait type, behavior valence, and behavior referent).
Finally, exploratory data was presented that assessed, after behavior recall, participants’
overall impressions of the self or Chris. Even though an equal number of positive and negative
behaviors were originally presented and even though they were identical for the self and Chris
(except for the referent), it was expected that due to self-protection mechanism underlying the
mnemic neglect effect, the self would be judged more positively than Chris.

Attempted Replication of Mnemic Neglect for Both the Social/Morality Dimension and the
Competence Dimension in Data Collection 1

Morality Dimension and Competence Dimension Combined. In an initial analysis of the
data from data collection 1, a 2 (Domain: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs.
peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris)
mixed-model ANOVA was conducted. The proportions of behaviors recalled in each cell of the
within-subjects design matrix was the dependent measure. Behavior referent and source were
between-subjects variables. Please see Table 15 for the observed recall proportions.
The mnemic neglect effect did not emerge: neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effect (p = .85) nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
interaction effect (p = .21) nor the Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent (p = .83) interaction effect was significant. The significant effects that did emerge are
listed in Table 16. Full analysis results appear in Appendix W.
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Table 15
Means and Standard Deviations of Recall Proportions for Study 3 in Data Collection 1
Morality

Competence

Central

Peripheral

Central

Peripheral

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

(Trustworthy)

(Untrustworthy)

(Modest)

(Immodest)

(Competent)

(Incompetent)

(Meticulous)

(Sloppy)

Self

.18 (.20)

.24 (.23)

.14 (.18)

.09 (.15)

.10 (.16)

.30 (.26)

.15 (.19)

.19 (.20)

Chris

.24 (.24)

.31 (.27)

.20 (.20)

.11 (.15)

.14 (.18)

.37 (.27)

.21 (.24)

.23 (.24)

Referent

Table 16
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Domain, Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior
Referent as Independent Variables in Data Collection 1
F

p

ηp2

Domain

9.40

.002

.03

Trait Type

66.09

< .001

.19

Behavior Valence

55.02

< .001

.17

Domain × Trait Type

19.79

< .001

.07

Domain × Behavior Valence

56.77

< .001

.17

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

91.86

< .001

.25

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.06

.08

.01

Behavior Referent

14.95

< .001

.05

Effect
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Decomposing the trending Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect
showed that for the social/morality domain the Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect
was significant, F(1, 279) = 31.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and the interaction effect is even stronger
for the competence domain, F(1, 279) = 65.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Considering first the
social/morality domain for further decomposition, in regards to central traits negative morality
behaviors (M = .27, SD = .25) were recalled better than positive morality behaviors (M = .21, SD
= .22), F(1, 279) = 10.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. In regards to peripheral traits it is positive morality
behaviors (M = .17, SD = .19) that were recalled better than negative morality behaviors (M =
.10, SD = .15), F(1, 279) = 25.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. Considering then the competence domain
for decomposition, in regards to central traits negative competence behaviors (M = .33, SD = .27)
were remembered far better than positive competence behaviors (M = .12, SD = .17), F(1, 279) =
166.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .37; for peripheral traits this pattern is present but only trending: negative
competence behaviors (M = .21, SD = .22) were remembered better than positive competence
behaviors (M = .18, SD = .22), F(1, 279) = 3.54, p = .06, ηp2 = .01.
The omnibus interaction effect qualifies interpretation of the significant effects of
domain, trait type and/or behavior valence. Additionally, significantly more Chris-referent
behaviors (M = .23, SD = .13) than self-referent behaviors (M = .17, SD = .10) were recalled,
F(1, 278) = 14.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .05.
The data from the omnibus analysis suggested that the mnemic neglect effect did not
emerge. However, it is possible the effect might have emerged on one trait dimension and not
the other and that this difference may not have been detected by the analysis. Thus, I searched
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for evidence of mnemic neglect via separate analyses of the social/morality data and the
competence data.

Social/Morality Dimension. The recall proportion data from the social morality
dimension behaviors only was analyzed via a 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior
Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-model ANOVA.
Behavior referent was the sole between-subjects variable in the analysis. Means and standard
deviations are listed in Table 15. Significant results of the analysis are listed in Table 17 and full
results for the analysis appear in Appendix X.

Table 17
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Morality Domain of Data Collection 1
F

p

ηp2

Trait Type

87.05

< .001

.24

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

31.45

< .001

.10

Behavior Referent

14.18

< .001

.05

Effect

Importantly neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent (p = .54) interaction effect
nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent (p = .46) interaction effect was
significant. Thus, no indication of mnemic neglect could be found.

84
Decomposing the significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed
that for central traits negative behaviors (M = .27, SD = .25) were recalled better than positive
behaviors (M = .21, SD = .22), F(1, 279) = 10.73, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. By contrast, for peripheral
traits positive behaviors (M = .17, SD = .19) were recalled better than negative behaviors (M =
.10, SD = .15), F(1, 279) = 25.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. This interaction effect qualifies
interpretation of the trait type main effect.
Finally, the behavior referent main effect indicates that Chris-referent behaviors (M = .22,
SD = .14) were recalled better than self-referent behaviors (M = .16, SD = .10), F(1, 278) =
14.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .05.

Competence Dimension. Similar to the morality dimension analyses, the recall
proportion data from the competence dimension behaviors was analyzed via a 2 (Trait Type:
central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self
vs. Chris) mixed-model ANOVA, was conducted with behavior referent as sole between-subjects
variable. Means and standard deviations are listed in Table 15. Significant results of the
analysis are listed in Table 18 and full results for the analysis appear in Appendix Y.
Importantly, again neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (p
= .73) nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (p = .30)
were significant. Thus, these data provided no indication of a mnemic neglect effect.
Decomposition of the Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed that for
central traits negative behaviors (M = .33, SD = .27) were recalled more than positive behaviors
(M = .12, SD = .17), F(1, 279) = 166.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. For peripheral traits this pattern was
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Table 18
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Competence Domain of Data Collection 1
F

p

ηp2

6.40

.01

.02

Behavior Valence

108.20

< .001

.28

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

64.92

< .001

.19

Behavior Referent

9.85

.002

.03

Effect
Trait Type

only marginally significant: negative behaviors (M = .21, SD = .22) were recalled only somewhat
more than positive behaviors (M = .18, SD = .22), F(1, 279) = 3.54, p = .06, ηp2 = .01. This
interaction effect also qualified interpretations of the trait type main effect and the behavior
valence main effect. Additionally, as indicated in the significant behavior referent main effect,
Chris-referent behaviors (M= .24, SD = .15) were again recalled more than self-referent
behaviors (M = .18, SD = .13), F(1, 278) = 9.85, p = .002, ηp2 = .03.

Attempted Replication of Mnemic Neglect for Both the Morality Dimension and the Competence
Dimension in Data Collection 2

Because the results from data collection 1 were surprising, I collected an additional
sample (data collection 2). I repeated both the methods used to collect the data from the sample
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used in data collection 1, and I repeated the data treatment protocol and the data analysis
protocols.
In an initial analysis of the recall proportion data from data collection 2, a 2 (Domain:
morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive
vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-model ANOVA was again conducted.
Behavior referent and source were between-subjects variables. Please see Table 19 for the
observed recall proportions. The significant effects emerged from the analysis are listed in Table
20. Full analysis results appear in Appendix Z.

Table 19
Means and Standard Deviations of Recall Proportions for Study 3 in Data Collection 2
Morality
Central

Competence
Peripheral

Central

Peripheral

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

(Trustworthy)

(Untrustworthy)

(Modest)

(Immodest)

(Competent)

(Incompetent)

(Meticulous)

(Sloppy)

Self

.19 (.22)

.25 (.22)

.18 (.21)

.08 (.14)

.09 (.16)

.31 (.28)

.14 (.21)

.20 (.25)

Chris

.26 (.22)

.30 (.24)

.19 (.21)

.13 (.16)

.14 (.17)

.36 (.28)

.16 (.21)

.23 (.25)

Referent

The mnemic neglect effect did not emerge: neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effect (p = .81) nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
interaction effect (p = .30) nor the Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent (p = .64) interaction effect was significant.
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Table 20
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Domain, Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior
Referent as Independent Variables in Data Collection 2
F

p

ηp2

Trait Type

77.57

< .001

.22

Behavior Valence

67.49

< .001

.20

Domain × Trait Type

15.06

< .001

.05

Domain × Behavior Valence

78.71

< .001

.22

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

75.15

< .001

.21

Behavior Referent

8.19

.005

.03

Effect

Decomposing the significant Domain × Trait Type interaction effect showed that for
morality traits behaviors implied central traits (M = .25, SD = .17) were recalled better than
behaviors that implied peripheral traits (M = .15, SD = .14), F(1, 277) = 88.72, p < .001, ηp2 =
.24. The same pattern but less pronounced was also observed for competence traits: behaviors
that implied central traits (M = .23, SD = .18) were also recalled better than behaviors that
implied peripheral traits (M = .18, SD = .18), F(1, 277) = 11.11, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. This
interaction effect also informed the trait type main effect.
Decomposing the significant Domain × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed that
in the social/morality domain there was no significant difference between recall of positive
behaviors and recall of negative behaviors (p = .18) while in the competence domain negative
behaviors (M = .27, SD = .21) were recalled better than positive behaviors (M = .13, SD = .15),

88
F(1, 277) = 121.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. This interaction effect also qualifies interpretation of the
behavior valence main effect.
Decomposing the significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed
central traits negative behaviors (M = .31, SD = .20) were recalled better than positive behaviors
(M = .17, SD = .15), F(1, 277) = 124.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, whereas this pattern was not
observed for peripheral behaviors (p = .46).
Additionally, as in data collection 1, more Chris-referent (M = .22, SD = .12) than selfreferent (M = .18, SD = .11) behaviors were recalled, F(1, 276) = 8.19, p = .01, ηp2 = .03.

Social/Morality Dimension Data. As for data collection 1 a subsidiary analysis of the
behavior recall data from the morality dimension only was performed via a 2 (Trait Type: central
vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs.
Chris) mixed-model ANOVA. Behavior referent was the sole between-subjects variable. Means
and standard deviations are listed in Table 19. Significant results of the analysis are listed in
Table 21 and full results for the analysis appear in Appendix AA.
Importantly, neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent (p = .58) interaction
effect nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent (p = .28) interaction effect
was significant. Thus, these data provided no indication of mnemic neglect.
Decomposing the significant Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed
that for central traits negative behaviors (M = .28, SD = .23) were recalled better than positive
behaviors (M = .23, SD = .22), F(1, 277) = 7.42, p = .007, ηp2 = .03. By contrast, for peripheral
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Table 21
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Morality Domain of Data Collection 2
F

p

ηp2

Trait Type

89.26

< .001

.24

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

28.52

< .001

.09

Behavior Referent

8.67

.004

.03

Effect

traits positive behaviors (M = .18, SD = .21) were recalled better than negative behaviors (M =
.11, SD = .15), F(1, 277) = 34.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .11.
This interaction effect also qualified interpretation of the trait type main effect. The
behavior referent main effect indicates that Chris-referent behaviors (M = .22, SD = .13) were
recalled better than self-referent behaviors (M = .18, SD = .13), F(1, 276) = 8.67, p = .004, ηp2 =
.03.
Competence Dimension Data. As for data collection 1 a subsidiary analysis of the
behavior recall data from the competence dimension only was performed via a 2 (Trait Type:
central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self
vs. Chris) mixed-model ANOVA; behavior referent was the sole between-subjects variable.
Means and standard deviations are listed in Table 19. Significant results of the analysis are listed
in Table 22 and full results for the analysis appear in Appendix BB.
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Table 22
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Competence Domain of Data Collection 2
F

p

ηp2

Trait Type

11.14

.001

.04

Behavior Valence

121.36

< .001

.31

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

42.40

< .001

.13

Behavior Referent

4.38

.04

.02

Effect

Importantly, again neither the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (p
= .87) nor the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (p = .72)
was significant. Thus, these data provided no indication of a mnemic neglect effect.
Decomposition of the Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect showed that for
central traits negative behaviors (M = .33, SD = .28) were recalled more than positive behaviors
(M = .12, SD = .17), F(1, 277) = 155.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. For peripheral traits this pattern was
weaker: negative behaviors (M = .21, SD = .25) were recalled more than positive behaviors (M =
.15, SD = .21), F(1, 277) = 12.27, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. This interaction effect also informed the
trait type and behavior valence main effects. Finally, as indicated in the significant behavior
referent main effect and as in the data from data collection 1, Chris-referent behaviors (M= .22,
SD = .15) were again recalled more than self-referent behaviors (M = .19, SD = .14), F(1, 276) =
4.38, p = .04, ηp2 = .02.
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Comparison of Results from Data Collection 1 and Data Collection 2

To ensure that the results of the first and second data collections were statistically similar,
a 2 (Domain: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior
Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Source: data
collection 1 vs. data collection 2) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with behavior referent
and source as between-subjects variables. For means and standard deviations for both samples
combined, see Table 23. The full results of the data analysis are included in Appendix CC.

Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations of Recall Proportions for Study 3 Combined
Morality
Central

Competence
Peripheral

Central

Peripheral

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

(Trustworthy)

(Untrustworthy)

(Modest)

(Immodest)

(Competent)

(Incompetent)

(Meticulous)

(Sloppy)

Self

.19 (.21)

.24 (.23)

.16 (.20)

.09 (.14)

.09 (.16)

.31 (.27)

.15 (.20)

.19 (.23)

Chris

.25 (.23)

.31 (.25)

.19 (.20)

.12 (.16)

.14 (.18)

.36 (.28)

.19 (.23)

.23 (.25)

Referent

The mnemic neglect effect did not emerge: neither behavior valence × behavior referent
(p = .98) nor trait type × behavior valence × behavior referent (p = .89) nor domain × trait type ×
behavior valence × behavior referent (p = .62) was significant. Additionally, there was no effect
for source or interaction effects with the source variables (all ps > .10), which confirmed that
there was no evidence that the results of data collection 1 and data collection 2 were significantly
different. The significant effects of the analysis that did emerge are listed in Table 24.
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Table 24
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Domain, Trait Type, Behavior Valence, Behavior
Referent and Source as Independent Variables
F

p

ηp2

6.47

.01

.01

143.40

< .001

.21

2.86

.09

.01

Behavior Valence

121.85

< .001

.18

Domain × Trait Type

34.69

< .001

.06

Domain × Behavior Valence

134.88

< .001

.20

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

166.60

< .001

.23

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.52

.06

.01

Behavior Referent

22.55

< .001

.04

Effect
Domain
Trait Type
Trait Type × Behavior Referent

Decomposing the trending Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect
showed that for the social/morality domain the Trait Type × Behavior Valence interaction effect
was significant, F(1, 557) = 60.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and the interaction effect is even stronger
for the competence domain, F(1, 557) = 106.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Considering first the
morality domain for further decomposition, in regards to central traits negative social/morality
behaviors (M = .27, SD = .24) were recalled better than positive social/morality behaviors (M =
.22, SD = .22), F(1, 557) = 18.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .03. In regards to peripheral traits it was
positive social/morality behaviors (M = .18, SD = .20) that were recalled better than negative
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morality behaviors (M = .10, SD = .15), F(1, 557) = 59.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Considering then
the competence domain for decomposition, in regards to central traits negative competence
behaviors (M = .33, SD = .28) were remembered far better than positive competence behaviors
(M = .12, SD = .17), F(1, 557) = 322.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. In regards to peripheral traits this
pattern is less extreme but also prevalent: negative competence behaviors (M = .21, SD = .24)
were remembered better than positive competence behaviors (M = .17, SD = .22), F(1, 557) =
14.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .03. This interaction effect qualified interpretation of the significant
effects of domain, trait type and/or behavior valence yielded by the main analysis.
Decomposing the Trait Type × Behavior Referent interaction effect showed for central
traits Chris-referent behaviors (M = .27, SD = .16) were recalled better than self-referent
behaviors (M = .21, SD = .13), F(1, 556) = 21.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. The decomposition
showed the same, but weaker, pattern for peripheral traits: Chris-referent behaviors (M = .18, SD
= .24) were again recalled better than self-referent behaviors (M = .15, SD = .12), F(1, 556) =
11.74, p = .001, ηp2 = .02. Interpretation of the significant main effect of behavior referent is
qualified by this interaction effect.

Comparison of the Morality Dimension in Study 3 with Study 2

To further pursue the observation that the morality data from Study 3 seemed to differ
from the data observed in Studies 1 and 2, I conducted an analysis comparing the data from those
studies. I formally compared data from Study 3 with the control condition from Study 2.
Because the control condition in Study 2 included only 132 participants, and the sample sizes in
both of the data collections in Study 3 contain over 170 participants each, I only used the data
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from one of the subsamples (data collection 2) for this analysis. That control condition yielded a
clear mnemic neglect effect. I wanted to verify that Study 2 found evidence of mnemic neglect
and that the social/morality data from Study 3 did not produce evidence of mnemic neglect using
only those Study 2 morality behaviors that also appeared in Study 3.
The proportions of morality behaviors common to both studies recalled in each of the
within-participant morality behavior cells were entered as dependent measures in a 2 (Trait
Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior
Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Source: control condition in Study 2 vs. Study 3 data collection 2)
mixed-model ANOVA. The significant results of the analysis are listed in Table 25. Full
analysis results appear in Appendix DD.

Table 25
Significant Effects of the ANOVA for Domain, Trait Type, Behavior Valence, Behavior
Referent and Source as Independent Variables
F

p

ηp2

Trait Type

96.22

< .001

.19

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

3.37

.07

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

33.55

< .001

.08

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent × Source

5.59

.02

.01

Behavior Referent

27.73

< .001

.06

Source

9.98

.002

.02

Behavior Referent × Source

3.55

.06

.01

Effect
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The key finding is that the mnemic neglect effect is modified by the source variable, F(1,
406) = 5.59, p = .02, ηp2 = .01. The means for this interaction appear in Table 26. Decomposing
the effect by source confirms that for Study 3 (data collection 2), the Trait Type × Behavior
Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect is not significant (p = .28), but while it is
significant for Study 2, F(1, 130) = 5.94, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Further decomposition of the
interaction effect shows that for peripheral traits the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
interaction effect was not significant in the control condition of Study 2 (p = .16), but for central
traits the interaction effect was significant, F(1, 130) = 4.20, p = .04, ηp2 = .03. Additional
decomposition of the interaction effect shows that for positive central traits in Study 2 selfreferent behaviors (M = .14, SD = .18) were recalled more poorly than Chris-referent behaviors
(M = .22, SD = .22), F(1, 130) = 4.10, p = .045, ηp2 = .03. However, for negative central traits in
Study 2 self-referent behaviors (M = .14, SD = .18) were recalled even less well than Chrisreferent behaviors (M = .30, SD = .24), F(1, 130) = 17.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Interpretations of
all other significant effects are qualified by the overall four-way interaction effect.

Table 26
Means and Standard Deviations for Morality Domain of Study 2 and Study 3 Data Collection 2
Study 2
Central

Study 3 Data Collection 2
Peripheral

Central

Peripheral

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

(Trustworthy)

(Untrustworthy)

(Modest)

(Immodest)

(Competent)

(Incompetent)

(Meticulous)

(Sloppy)

Self

.14 (.18)

.14 (.18)

.09 (.15)

.06 (.11)

.18 (.20)

.24 (.23)

.14 (.18)

.09 (.15)

Chris

.22 (.22)

.30 (.24)

.19 (.21)

.11 (.15)

.24 (.24)

.31 (.27)

.20 (.20)

.11 (.15)

Referent
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The result of this last analysis confirms that recall of social/morality-based behaviors
yielded evidence of a mnemic neglect effect in Study 2 but not in Study 3. This result suggests
that adding the competence behaviors to the social/morality behaviors used in Study 2 had the
unexpected effect of causing the mnemic neglect effect that was present in Study 2 to dissipate.

Evaluations of Self vs. Chris Based on Behavior Display

Rarely assesed in mnemic neglect studies are judgments about Chris and the self. This is
curious given that judgments that are made about a target might be useful in organizing memory
and in recalling information about the referent (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Hastie and
Kumar, 1979). In addition, from a motivational perspective one might expect to see a bias in
these judgments such that the self would be judged to be more positive than Chris.
Accordingly, in Study 3, based on the behaviors presented, people were asked to make an
evaluative judgment about the behavior referent (self or Chris). Results from an independent
samples t test showed that, as expected, the self (M = 0.44, SD = 1.37) was indeed overall judged
as better than Chris (M = -0.39, SD = 1.15), t(275) = -5.49, p < .001, d = 0.66. Thus, a negativity
bias emerged in the judgments made about Chris, which is consistent with results obtained in the
person perception domain (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). In comparison, from the
same corpus of behaviors that people used to negatively evaluate Chris, people evaluated the self
positively. This result is consistent with the action of self-enhancement and self-protection
motivation (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) on self-thought.
Of additional interest was whether the behaviors recalled predicted these judgments (for
more on the judgment recall issue, see Hastie & Park, 1986). To explore this issue, I calculated
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correlations between the overall judgment rating for the self and for Chris and the difference
scores between recall for positive behaviors vs. negative behaviors within each cell of the
Domain × Trait Type matrix were assessed. The results are listed in Table 27.

Table 27
Correlations Between Overall Judgment and Valence Difference Scores
for Domain × Trait Type (n = 279)
Combined
Valence Difference

Overall Judgment

M

SD

Self

Chris

Central
(Trustworthiness)

-0.060

.306

.249

-.105

Peripheral
(Modesty)

-0.069

.229

-.046

-.077

Overall Morality

0.005

.191

.187

-.138

Central
(Competence)

-0.214

.279

.112

.191

Peripheral
(Meticulousness)

-0.031

.271

.088

.223

Overall Competence

-0.122

.197

.149

.269

-0.059

.133

.253

.141

Morality

Competence

Overall

Note: Numbers in italics indicate 2-tailed significance at the .05 level while numbers in bold indicate 2-tailed significance at the
.001 level.

The overall pattern of correlations indicate that in the social/morality domain the overall
judgment of the self was positively associated with increasing positivity in the behavior recall
difference score. In the competence domain, no significant correlations emerged between the
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evaluative judgment of the self and the recall difference score. In comparison, the evaluation of
Chris was not correlated with the social/morality behavior difference score, but the evaluation of
Chris was positively correlated with the competence behavior difference score.
One might look at these results and suggest that they do not fit contemporary theorizing.
For example, according to Wojciszke (2005), we tend to be concerned more with our own
competence rather than morality while the morality of others is more important to us than their
competence. This seems to lead to the prediction that we would think better of ourselves if the
gap between remembered positive competence behaviors and negative competence behaviors
were larger and we would think better of others if the gap between remembered positive
social/morality behaviors and negative social/morality behaviors were larger. However, exactly
the opposite pattern emerged.
However, past research also suggests that one should use great caution when considering
the implications of such correlations. One of the reasons is that people tend to “go beyond the
information given” and spontaneously form traits and evaluations of others (see McCarthy &
Skowronski, 2014) as they process the behaviors of others. Hastie and Park (1986) note that
when people think in such an on-line fashion, there is no necessary correlation between the
information that people remember and the importance of that information to the judgments made
about a social target. Thus, the extent to which the correlations that emerged from Study 3 might
directly attack the Wojciszke (2005) view is limited.
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Discussion

The purpose of the third study was to replicate the mnemic neglect effect in the
social/morality domain and to see if the effect extended to the competence domain. To pursue
this goal, the mnemic neglect paradigm was expanded so that it contained both behaviors that
were linked to morality-relevant traits and behaviors that were linked to competence-relevant
traits. The paradigm that I constructed deleted one of the central social/moral trait dimensions
(kind) and one of the peripheral social/moral trait dimensions (uncomplaining) typically included
in the paradigm and replaced them with one central competence trait dimension (competent) and
one peripheral competence trait dimension (meticulous).
The results from Study 3 were a surprise. Not only did I not find a mnemic neglect effect
for the competence domain, I also did not find an effect for the social/morality domain. These
latter results differed from the results obtained in Study 1 and Study 2, both of which evinced
reliable mnemic neglect effects for behaviors in the social/morality domain.
One possible reason for the absence of the mnemic neglect effect (in particular in the
morality domain) in Study 3 was its use of behaviors related to trustworthiness. That is, the
results of Study 1 and Study 2 used both trustworthiness-related behaviors and kindness-related
behaviors and found a mnemic neglect effect when collapsing across both event types. However,
it is possible that the effect was localized in the kindness-related behaviors, but not in the
trustworthiness-related behaviors. I checked on this possibility by re-analyzing the data from
both Study 1 and Study 2. I focused on the central condition and analyzed the recall proportion
data from the central trait condition of each study in a 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs.
negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Trait Dimension: trustworthiness vs.
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kindness) ANOVA. Examination of the means showed that the mnemic neglect effect was a
little weaker on the trustworthiness dimension than on the kindness dimension, especially in
Study 1, but the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Trait Dimension interaction effect was
not significant for either Study 1 (p > .15) or Study 2 (p > .55). Moreover, analyses of both sets
of data yielded evidence of mnemic neglect effects via significant Behavior Valence × Behavior
Referent interaction effects in each study (Study 1: F(1, 512) = 8.01, p = .005, ηp2 = .02; Study 2:
F(1, 298) = 4.74, p = .03, ηp2 = .02) the means for these effects are presented in Table 28 and
full analysis results are listed in Appendix EE.

Table 28
Subsidiary Analyses of Trustworthy Data and Kind Data for Study 1 and Study 2 – Data From
All Conditions Included
Study 1

Study 2

Trustworthy

Kind

Trustworthy

Kind

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

(Trustworthy)

(Untrustworthy)

(Kind)

(Unkind)

(Trustworthy)

(Incompetent)

(Kind)

(Unkind)

Self

.20 (20)

.20 (.21)

.34 (.26)

.19 (.19)

.18 (.20)

.19 (.21)

.31 (.27)

.20 (.23)

Chris

.24 (.21)

.27 (.24)

.34 (.23)

.26 (.23)

.26 (.22)

.31 (.24)

.36 (.23)

.31 (.24)

Referent

Given that the absence of a mnemic neglect effect on the social/morality dimension in
Study 3 cannot seemingly be attributed to the exclusive use of behaviors related to
trustworthiness, it may be that other elements of the Study 3 procedure could have produced the
dissipation of the effect. The basic procedures used in all three studies were the same; the only
difference was that in Study 3 the competence stimuli replaced one set of social/morality stimuli.
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Accordingly, I suspect that the elimination of the menemic neglect effect in the morality domain
in Study 3 (verified in two separate samples) was caused by the inclusion of the competence
behaviors in the mnemic neglect paradigm. It is possible that the inclusion of any competence
behaviors could cause the dissipation of the mnemic neglect effect. However, it is also possible
that the unique characteristics of the competence behaviors used in this specific study was the
key. In particular, the incompetent behaviors were distinctive, attention grabbing and almost
comical.
In retrospect, I can see potential explanations for why this dissipation occurred. The
mnemic neglect paradigm was derived from the person memory paradigm (e.g., Hastie &
Kumar, 1979). The person memory paradigm seemed to work in a very reliable manner when
the behaviors presented to participants reflected only a single trait dimension. However, as
behaviors related to additional trait dimensions were included in the paradigm, the effects
typically observed in that paradigm began to dissipate (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1980;
Skowronski, Betz, Sedikides, & Crawford, 1998). The speculation about why this occurred was
that the inclusion of behaviors with so many different trait-relevant implications made it hard for
participants to think in the way that they did when there was only a single trait dimension
reflected in the behaviors. In this way, the inclusion of behaviors that reflected multiple trait
dimensions may have acted as a cognitive load, a manipulation that is known to reduce an
individual’s ability to think about and organize incoming person-relevant information. A similar
effect may have occurred here. The inclusion in the paradigm of competence dimension-related
behavior might have disrupted information processing. This idea is further enhanced by the fact
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that we know that direct disruption via cognitive load minimizes the mnemic neglect effect
(Zengel et al., 2016).
This reasoning leads to two lines of potential future research. The first line of research
examines the original idea that drove Study 3: to find evidence of mnemic neglect in the
competence domain. If my reasoning is correct, however, this research would have to be done in
the context of a paradigm that presented only competence-related behaviors. This should
minimize cognitive load and allow for the emergence of self-protection-driven mnemic neglect,
should such an effect exist in the competence domain (and there is still some reason to believe
that it may not).
The second line of research would directly test the cognitive load explanation that I have
offered for Study 3. Such research would systematically compare in the context of a single study
memory for social/morality behaviors and memory for competence behaviors when both kinds of
behaviors appear in a target description as compared to a circumstance in which the presentation
contains only one or the other. If my post hoc explanation of Study 3 is correct, I should see that
mnemic neglect emerges in the single-dimension presentations but not in the multiple-dimension
presentations.

CHAPTER 5

GENERAL DISCUSSION

There is a long list of literature that looks for evidence of valence effects in recall (for a
brief overview, see Skowronski, 2011). The question asked by this research is whether people
have better memory for learned positive information or learned negative information. The
results from that literature are quite mixed, in part because comparisons are made across stimuli.
That inconsistency is mirrored by the results of the research that I report in this dissertation.
Sometimes in my studies positive behaviors were recalled at a higher rate than negative
behaviors, but sometimes the reverse occurred. One of the reasons why the valence effects that
emerge from the literature are so mixed is because those effects typically compare memory
across stimuli. Because stimuli can vary in many ways other than valence (e.g., typicality,
expectedness, concreteness, complexity, self-relevance), the mixed findings for valence might
not be at all surprising. It is difficult to assess the effects of valence on memory independently
of these other confounding factors.
A new twist to the examination of valence effects in recall was provided by Sedikides
and Green (2000). Their mnemic neglect paradigm compares people’s free recall performance
for exactly the same information when that information is said to describe the participant (the
self) versus when that information is said to describe another person (named Chris). The results
that typically emerge from the paradigm show that free recall is impaired for self-framed
negative information relative to Chris-framed negative information, especially when that

104
information pertains to traits that are important to (or that are central to) the self. This referent
effect does not typically occur for positive information. Sedikides and Green (2000) suggest that
this referent effect in recall for negative information reflects self-protection motives. Those
motives are thought to be linked to cognitive processes (e.g., lack of rehearsal, storage that
isolates the negative information from the self concept so it becomes difficult to find in a
memory search) that affect free recall.
Some of the existing research that has explored mnemic neglect has tried to support this
view by searching for moderators of the mnemic neglect effect. Results from such research
shows that the mnemic neglect effect is diminished or even disappears for those who: (1)
received an ego-inflation manipulation prior to receiving the feedback (Green et al., 2008), (2)
were primed with self-improvement strivings (Green et al., 2009, Study 1), (3) believed that the
behaviors were sent by a close relationship partner (Green et al., 2009, Study 2), or (4) were
exposed to mindfulness training (Saunders et al., 2013). Several individual differences also are
related to mnemic neglect. Specifically, those high in defensive pessimism do not display the
mnemic neglect effect (Newman et al., 2009), and it was also reduced for individuals with
dysphoria (Saunders, 2011), trait anxiety (Saunders, 2013), or social anxiety (Zengel et al.,
2015).
The research that I conducted for this dissertation can be viewed as an extension of this
search for theoretically important moderators of the mnemic neglect effect. Study 1 looked for
evidence that mnemic neglect was related to an individual’s regulatory focus. Though not
entirely conclusive, the weight of the evidence in Study 1 suggested that regulatory focus does
not moderate the mnemic neglect effect. This lack of moderation was evident both when
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regulatory focus was treated as a measured trait and in response to a priming manipulation that
attempted to change an individual’s regulatory focus state.
Study 2 used a self-improvement manipulation known from past research (Green et al.,
2009) to moderate the mnemic neglect effect. In Study 2 the timing of this manipulation was
varied. While some participants were not exposed to this manipulation, other participants were
exposed to it. Some of these latter participants received the manipulation prior to reading the
behaviors in the mnemic neglect paradigm, while others received the manipulation after reading
the behaviors in the paradigm. Mnemic neglect has been thought to be largely caused by
processes that occur during behavior encoding. If this were the case, then only the selfimprovement instruction that occurred prior to reading the behaviors in the mnemic neglect
paradigm should produce a moderation of the mnemic neglect effect. The data from Study 2 are
not entirely conclusive, but on balance they favor this hypothesis. Though results from an
omnibus ANOVA indicated that the Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent
interaction effect was not significantly moderated by the priming manipulation, results from
subsidiary analyses suggested that this three-way interaction effect was significant in the control
condition and in the post-encoding condition but not in the pre-encoding condition. Results from
analyses that focused only on recall of central negative behaviors suggested that the priming
manipulation did improve recall for self-framed behaviors that were relevant to central trait
dimensions, but only when the priming manipulation occurred before exposure to the behaviors.
One observation that ought to be noted about Studies 1 and 2 is that analyses of both
studies yielded an interaction effect between the variables of trait type, behavior valence and
behavior referent that is typical of much previous mnemic neglect research. Examination of the
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means for this effect showed that, as expected, recall for self-framed central negative events was
low relative to recall for those same events when they were Chris-framed. This pattern did not
emerge at all in Study 3. Study 3 was designed to see if the same mnemic neglect effect that
characterized behaviors that reflected social/morality traits (the ones typically used in the
paradigm) also appeared for behaviors that reflected competence dimension-related traits. To
explore this idea, the mnemic neglect paradigm was modified to include one set of behaviors that
reflected competence or incompetence (competent dimension central) and another set of
behaviors that reflected meticulousness or sloppiness (competence dimension peripheral). Two
other sets of social/morality behaviors (central = trustworthiness, peripheral = modesty) were
retained form the original mnemic neglect paradigm. Not only was no mnemic neglect effect
observed for the central competence behaviors, the inclusion of those behaviors seemingly wiped
out the effect that had emerged in the previous two studies for the trustworthiness behaviors.
This is likely not a false negative effect – it was found in two separate replications of Study 3.
One possible reason for this absence of a mnemic neglect effect in Study 3 was that
including the two sets of competence dimension-related behaviors to the two sets of
social/morality behaviors held over from the original paradigm may have inadvertently acted as a
cognitive load, disrupting the kind of processing that is needed to obtain a mnemic neglect effect.
While this is post hoc speculation that needs to be tested in future research, the speculation is
consistent with similar multi-trait study results obtained in the person memory paradigm (e.g.,
Hamilton et al., 1980; Skowronski et al., 1998).
One other issue of note in my studies is that across all three studies there was a general
reduced recall for self-referent behaviors relative to recall for exactly the same behaviors when
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they were Chris-framed. This finding has not been evident in other mnemic neglect research. I
can think of at least three reasons for this effect.
The first is that my studies did not use the typical university undergraduate sample, but
instead used a sample of individuals from the “real world.” One might speculate that in
comparison to a broader real-world sample, because they are relatively immature, typical
undergraduates might tend to be especially self-focused or self-defensive, which may tend to be
especially likely to produce evidence of mnemic neglect. Specifically, student samples have
been reported to differ from MTurk samples in age, gender composition, language fluency,
cognitive and personality characteristics. The typical MTurker is 32 years of age and thus older
than the typical student (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Goodman et al., 2013; Shapiro,
Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). How many women compared to men participate in studies on
MTurk varies. For example, Goodman and colleagues (2013) recorded 42.5% female
participation while Paolacci, Chander and Ipeirotis (2010) noted 75% female participation.
Without regional restriction, over 50% MTurkers are non-native English speakers (for U.S
restriction: less than 10%; Goodman et al., 2013). Furthermore, compared to a student sample,
MTurk workers also tend to perform less well on a cognitive reflection test, are less extraverted,
less emotionally stable, less conscientious and have less self-esteem (Goodman et al., 2013).
The samples I collected were restricted to the U.S. and participants were excluded when they
indicated that English was their second language. However, differences in age and cognitive
ability as well as personality characteristics are some of the differences that show up in these
more “real-world” samples that could have influenced the results of the studies I performed.
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A second reason might lie in methodology. Mnemic neglect studies have typically been
conducted in a laboratory context, whereas the studies that I report in this dissertation were
conducted over the internet such that people completed the studies at a time and in a place of
their own choosing. Perhaps one unintended consequence of this method shift is that my selfphrased behaviors may have been discounted by participants as they were encountered. That is,
our participants may have thought on reading the behaviors, “This is not me” or “I would not do
this.” After all, even some of the positive behaviors were unusual or extreme, and perhaps the
participants in the internet sample were especially likely to discount the self-relevance of those
behaviors. In contrast, because of the high credibility of the laboratory setting, undergraduates
may be more receptive to the “imagine that you did these behaviors” instructions that I used.
A third reason for the self/Chris recall effect that I consistently obtained may come from
the so-called fan effect (Anderson, 1974; Radvansky, 1999; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). The
effect is easy to understand: the more units of information that one has to recall in a task, the
less likely it is that any single unit of information will be recalled. For example, according to
this effect, if I have to recall all the street names in my town, I will be more likely to remember
“State Street” if there are only 15 other streets in town than if there are 50 other streets in town.
Applying this idea to the self/Chris effect that I obtained in this study is straightforward. Before
entering the study I know a lot of facts about the self, but none about Chris. Thus, after I learn
the new referent behaviors in the study, it is more likely that I will retrieve a given fact in the
context of a small corpus of referent knowledge (Chris) than in the context of a large amount of
referent knowledge (the self). While this explanation makes theoretical sense, it does not explain
why the referent effect that I obtained in my studies was more pronounced than it is in typical
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mnemic neglect research. Understanding this difference is one of the goals that can be pursued
in future research.

CHAPTER 6

CODA

Overall, the studies that I report in this dissertation confirm that there is much work yet to
be done to further explore the mnemic neglect effect. Investigations of moderation effects might
be seen as low-hanging fruit, but such investigations can get complicated and can require
considerable work. For example, as illustrated by Study 3, such explorations might require
development of new sets of traits and behaviors. I encourage such activity – in my opinion, the
existing mnemic neglect research has been far too dependent on a limited set of traits and
behaviors that derive from the original Sedikides and Green (2000) work. Progress in science
requires methodological variation, and that variation is, in my opinion, definitely not present in
the existing corpus of mnemic neglect research. This is one reason why I pursued the
social/morality distinction in Study 3, and it is a reason why, despite Study 3’s results, such
methodological variation needs continued pursuit.
The precise cognitive processes underlying mnemic neglect will also require more
attention. Some progress has been made in this area. Examples come from the results of studies
that explore the effects of separation and integration of information on mnemic neglect (Pinter et
al., 2011) and the effect of cognitive load on mnemic neglect (Zengel et al., 2016). However,
there is much about how cognitive processing produces mnemic neglect that is not understood.
For example, is mnemic neglect just the result of a lazy information search? What if participants
were given an incentive for correct behavior recall? Would such incentives be able to overcome
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the supposed storage inaccessibility of self-relevant negative information? A second issue is
whether mnemic neglect can be overcome via cueing at recall. The typical mnemic neglect
memory task is free recall – what if that were a cued recall task? Certainly, cues about the
behavior itself should work to remove the effect. Such cues seem to be close to a recognition
task, which is known to eliminate mnemic neglect. What about a trait prompt? It is known that
people often make trait inferences when reading behaviors (e.g., McCarthy & Skowronski,
2014). Would providing a trait cue be enough to help a participant recall an item that is
otherwise lost in memory (see Zengel et al., 2016)?
Finally, at the end of the day, one should not lose sight of the implications of the mnemic
neglect effect for people in the real world. This effect is not simply a laboratory toy. For
example, one domain in which awareness of mnemic neglect may be important is in corrective
training. The mnemic neglect effect suggests that students may sometimes forget negative
feedback from instructors, that employees may sometimes forget negative feedback from bosses,
and that athletes may forget negative feedback from trainers. It is important for feedback givers
to know that such effects are possible. To combat such effects, feedback givers might need to
both reduce the threat that comes with negative feedback and reinforce the content of the
feedback. Examples of such techniques might be to have feedback givers and recipients both
repeat the feedback, to place feedback in writing, and to try to minimize the self-threat that
comes with negative feedback. Such possibilities and ideas illustrate the potential that can be
realized by conducting additional research into the phenomenon of mnemic neglect.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: MANIPULATION OF REGULATORY FOCUS
(BASED ON WINTERHELD & SIMPSON, 2011)
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Promotion Focus Induction
Please thing about something you really would like to do. In other words, think about a hope
or aspiration that you currently have.
Please list up to three such hopes or aspirations below:
1. Hope/Aspiration ___________________________________________
2. Hope/Aspiration ___________________________________________
3. Hope/Aspiration ___________________________________________

Prevention Focus Induction
Please think about something you think you ought to do. In other words, think about a duty or
obligation that you currently have.
Please list up to three such duties or obligations below:
1. Duty/Obligation ___________________________________________
2. Duty/Obligation ___________________________________________
3. Duty/Obligation ___________________________________________

APPENDIX B: BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS IN STUDY 1 AND STUDY 2
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Self-Framed Behaviors

Untrustworthy Behaviors
1. I would borrow other people’s belongings without their knowledge.
2. I would be unfaithful when in an intimate relationship.
3. I would often lie to my parents.
4. An employer would not rely on me to have an important project completed by the deadline.

Trustworthy Behaviors
5. I would keep secrets when asked to.
6. I would follow through on a promise made to friends.
7. A teacher would leave me alone in a room while taking a test and not be afraid that I would
cheat.
8. People would be willing to tell me embarrassing things about themselves in confidence.

Unkind Behaviors
9. I would make fun of others because of their looks.
10. I would purposely hurt someone to benefit me.
11. I would refuse to lend classnotes to a friend who was ill.
12. I would make an obscene gesture to an old lady.
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Kind Behaviors
13. I would offer to care for a neighbor’s child when the babysitter could not come.
14. I would help people by opening a door if their hands were full.
15. I would help a handicapped neighbor paint his house.
16. I would volunteer time to work as a big brother/big sister to a child in need.

Immodest Behaviors
17. I would act in a condescending manner to other people.
18. I would point out others’ weaknesses to make myself look better.
19. I would talk more about myself than about others.
20. I would like to show off in front of others.

Modest Behaviors
21. I would take the focus off myself and redirect it to others.
22. I would let some of my achievements go by unaccredited.
23. I would give others the credit for a group success.
24. I would never openly brag about my accomplishments.

Complaining Behaviors
25. I would look for faults even if my life was going well.
26. When I would not like to do something, I would constantly mention it.
27. I would constantly talk about how much stuff there is to be done.
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28. I would pick only the bad points to describe the classes I attend.

Uncomplaining Behaviors
29. I would rarely inform others about physical ailments.
30. I would overlook the bad points about a roommate.
31. I would minimize bad experiences when telling about them.
32. I would tolerate situations even when not having a good time.

Chris-Framed Behaviors

Untrustworthy Behaviors
1. Chris would borrow other people’s belongings without their knowledge.
2. Chris would be unfaithful when in an intimate relationship.
3. Chris] would often lie to Chris’s parents.
4. An employer would not rely on Chris to have an important project completed by the deadline.

Trustworthy Behaviors
5. Chris would keep secrets when asked to.
6. Chris would follow through on a promise made to friends.
7. A teacher would leave Chris alone in a room while taking a test and not be afraid that Chris
would cheat.
8. People would be willing to tell Chris embarrassing things about themselves in confidence.
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Unkind Behaviors
9. Chris would make fun of others because of their looks.
10. Chris would purposely hurt someone to benefit Chris.
11. Chris would refuse to lend classnotes to a friend who was ill.
12. Chris would make an obscene gesture to an old lady.

Kind Behaviors
13. Chris would offer to care for a neighbor’s child when the babysitter could not come.
14. Chris would help people by opening a door if their hands were full.
15. Chris would help a handicapped neighbor paint his house.
16. Chris would volunteer time to work as a big brother/big sister to a child in need.

Immodest Behaviors
17. Chris would act in a condescending manner to other people.
18. Chris would point out others’ weaknesses to make Chris look better.
19. Chris would talk more about Chris than about others.
20. Chris would like to show off in front of others.

Modest Behaviors
21. Chris would take the focus off Chris and redirect it to others.
22. Chris would let some of Chris’s achievements go by unaccredited.
23. Chris would give others the credit for a group success.

126
24. Chris would never openly brag about Chris’s accomplishments.

Complaining Behaviors
25. Chris would look for faults even if Chris’s life was going well.
26. When Chris would not like to do something, Chris would constantly mention it.
27. Chris would constantly talk about how much stuff there is to be done.
28. Chris would pick only the bad points to describe the classes Chris attends.

Uncomplaining Behaviors
29. Chris would rarely inform others about physical ailments.
30. Chris would overlook the bad points about a roommate.
31. Chris would minimize bad experiences when telling about them.
32. Chris would tolerate situations even when not having a good time.

APPENDIX C: REGULATORY FOCUS QUESTIONNAIRE
(HIGGINS ET AL., 2001)
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1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

sometimes

5
very often

2. Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would not
tolerate?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

sometimes

5
very often

3. How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work even harder?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

a few times

5
many times

4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

sometimes

5
very often

5. How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

sometimes

5
always

6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable?
1
never or seldom

2

3
sometimes

4

5
very often
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7. Do you often do well at different things that you try?
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

5

sometimes

very often

8. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times.
1

2

never or seldom

3

4

5

sometimes

very often

9. When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as well
as I ideally would like to do.
1

2

never true

3

4

5

sometimes true

very often true

10. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life
1

2

3

4

certainly false

5
certainly true

11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate me
to put effort into them.
1

2

3

certainly false

Items 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, and 11 are Promotion scale items.
Items 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are Prevention scale items.
Reverse coded items: 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11

4

5
certainly true

APPENDIX D: CODING OF RECALLED ITEMS
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The recalled items will be coded as follows:
1. If the recalled sentence matches the general meaning of a behavior description:
 Enter the number of the behavior description (even if it was recalled more than
once, then enter the behavior description number more than once)
2. If the recalled sentence has the reverse meaning of a behavior description:
 Enter: - #behavior description (so the as for 1. but as NEGATIVE number)
3. If the recalled sentence does not match any behavior description (or its reverse)
 Enter: 0
Examples 1
Original generic sentence:
X would look comfortable and relaxed when being interviewed for a new job.
Same general meaning:
I look comfortable being interviewed.
Chris looked relaxed interviewing for a new job.
Reverse meaning:
I look nervous interviewing for a new job.
Chris was tense being interviewed.
Example 2
Original generic sentence:
X would laugh along with everyone else at the embarrassing stories from when X
was young that his/her dad was telling about him/her to everyone at the wedding
reception.
Same general meaning:
I would also laugh at a joke about me when I was young at a wedding.
Chris laughed along with other guests about a story his father told from a time
when he was young and did something stupid.
Reverse meaning
I was embarrassed about a story my father told from when I was young.
I was humiliated in front of wedding guests by my father with some story.

APPENDIX E: FULL RESULTS OF PRIMING CONDITION × TRAIT TYPE × BEHAVIOR
VALENCE × BEHAVIOR REFERENT MIXED-METHOD ANOVA IN STUDY 1
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Full Results of 3 (Priming Condition: promotion focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2
(Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior
Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-method ANOVA in Study 1

F

p

ηp2

708.04

< .001

.58

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

3.18

.08

.01

Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.46

.63

.002

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.88

.42

.003

Behavior Valence

44.10

< .001

.08

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

7.91

.01

.02

Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.92

.40

.004

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.42

.66

.002

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

4.15

.04

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

5.93

.02

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.75

.48

.003

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent ×
Priming Condition

1.80

.17

.01

Behavior Referent

16.39

< .001

.03

Priming Condition

0.51

.60

.002

Behavior Referent × Priming Conditions

0.25

.78

.001

Effect
Trait Type

APPENDIX F: FULL RESULTS OF TRAIT TYPE × BEHAVIOR VALENCE × BEHAVIOR
REFERENT MIXED-MODEL ANOVA IN EACH CONDITION OF STUDY 1
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Full Results of Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent mixed-model ANOVA
separately in each priming condition of Study 1

Control Condition
F

p

ηp2

522.16

< .001

.66

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

7.82

.01

.03

Behavior Valence

32.25

< .001

.11

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

2.24

.14

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.19

.66

.001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.14

.71

.001

Behavior Referent

6.74

.01

.02

F

p

ηp2

159.54

< .001

.55

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.83

.37

.01

Behavior Valence

20.10

< .001

.13

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.84

.18

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

2.15

.15

.02

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.06

.31

.01

Behavior Referent

5.47

.02

.04

Effect
Trait Type

Prevention Focus Priming
Effect
Trait Type
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Promotion Focus Priming
F

p

ηp2

175.57

< .001

.62

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.02

.90

< .001

Behavior Valence

6.10

.02

.05

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.85

.03

.04

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.91

.17

.02

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

6.00

.02

.05

Behavior Referent

4.98

.03

.04

Effect
Trait Type

APPENDIX G: FULL RESULTS OF PRIMING CONDITION × BEHAVIOR REFERENT ×
TRAIT TYPE (FOR NEGATIVE BEHAVIORS) MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
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Full Results of 3 (Priming Condition: promotion focus vs. prevention focus vs. control) × 2
(Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) x 2 (Trait Type: self-central vs. self-peripheral) mixed-model
ANOVA only on negative behaviors

F

p

ηp2

307.78

< .001

.38

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

8.74

.003

.02

Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.71

.49

.003

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.08

.92

< .001

Behavior Referent

25.60

< .001

.05

Priming Condition

0.77

.46

.003

Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.54

.59

.002

Effect
Trait Type

APPENDIX H: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION WITH
ATTENTIVENESS VARIABLE IN STUDY 1

140
Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Priming Condition × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Attentiveness in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

929.88

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.01

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.86

.17

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

4.98

.03

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

7.39

.01

Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.61

.54

Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.09

.37

Attentiveness × Trait Type

19.03

< .001

Attentiveness × Behavior Valence

1.58

.21

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.65

.06

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.56

.57

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

< .01

.97

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.33

.27

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

1.08

.30

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.78

.46

Attentiveness × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.15

.28

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.34

.71

Attentiveness × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.26

.77

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

2.43

.09

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.88

.17

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.56

.21

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.44

.64

Attentiveness × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.14

.87

Attentiveness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming
Condition

0.81

.44

APPENDIX I: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION WITH
DISTRACTEDNESS VARIABLE IN STUDY 1
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Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Priming Condition × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Distractedness in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

929.88

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.01

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.68

.20

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

6.31

.01

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

6.35

.01

Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.66

.52

Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.10

.33

Distractedness × Trait Type

11.10

.001

Distractedness × Behavior Valence

0.55

.46

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.26

.07

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.46

.63

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.24

.62

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.22

.30

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.79

.37

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.66

.52

Distractedness × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.44

.51

Distractedness × Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.05

.96

Distractedness × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.09

.92

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

2.06

.13

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

2.56

.11

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.37

.26

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.00

.37

Distractedness × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.57

.21

Distractedness × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming
Condition

1.40

.24

APPENDIX J: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION WITH
INDEX OF ATTENTIVENESS AND DISTRACTEDNESS IN STUDY 1
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Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Priming Condition × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Index of Attentiveness and Distractedness in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

929.88

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.01

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.68

.19

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

5.54

.02

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

6.58

.01

Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.70

.50

Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.09

.34

Index × Trait Type

18.15

< .001

Index × Behavior Valence

1.16

.28

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.25

.07

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.45

.63

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.13

.72

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.40

.25

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.90

.34

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.74

.477

Index × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.04

.31

Index × Trait Type × Priming Condition

0.14

.87

Index × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

0.11

.90

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

2.21

.11

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.10

.08

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Priming Condition

1.85

.16

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

0.15

.86

Index × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming Condition

1.03

.36

Index × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Priming
Condition

1.08

.34

APPENDIX K: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION OF
TRAIT TYPE, BEHAVIOR VALENCE, BEHAVIOR REFERENT, AND PREVENTION
FOCUS IN STUDY 1
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Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Prevention Focus × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

912.70

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.97

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

6.27

.01

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

7.17

.01

Prevention Focus × Trait Type

1.76

.19

Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence

4.59

.03

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.93

.16

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.82

.36

Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.13

.72

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

2.90

.09

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.02

.08

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.40

.24

APPENDIX L: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION OF
TRAIT TYPE, BEHAVIOR VALENCE, BEHAVIOR REFERENT, AND PROMOTION
FOCUS IN STUDY 1
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Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Promotion Focus × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

912.70

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.97

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

6.19

.01

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

7.21

.01

Promotion Focus × Trait Type

0.43

.51

Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence

1.78

.18

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.93

.17

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.21

.65

Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.01

.92

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.13

.72

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.11

.08

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.25

.61

APPENDIX M: RESULTS OF WITHIN-SUBJECTS HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION OF
TRAIT TYPE, BEHAVIOR VALENCE, BEHAVIOR REFERENT, PREVENTION FOCUS,
AND PROMOTION FOCUS IN STUDY 1

150
Full Results of within-subjects hierarchical regression for Priming Condition × Trait Type ×
Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Index of Attentiveness and Distractedness in Study 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

912.70

< .001

Behavior Valence

50.97

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

6.34

.01

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

6.99

.01

Prevention Focus × Trait Type

1.56

.21

Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence

3.91

.05

Promotion Focus × Trait Type

.23

.63

Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence

1.11

.29

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.93

.16

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.94

.33

Prevention Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.05

.82

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

2.78

.10

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

2.99

.08

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.42

.52

< .001

.94

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.02

.90

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Trait Type

< .001

.97

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence

1.16

.28

Prevention Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.98

.32

Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.19

.66

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.68

.06

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.59

.44

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.48

.03

Prevention Focus × Promotion Focus × Trait Type × Behavior Valence ×
Behavior Referent

0.14

.71

Promotion Focus × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

APPENDIX N: PRIMING FOR STUDY 2
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Priming based on Green, Sedikides, Pinter, and Van Tongeren (2009, Study 1)
LANGUAGE FLUENCY STUDY (Note: improvement priming)

In the following, you will be a number of “scrambled sentences.” Out of each group, one word
has to be removed, and the remaining words have to be rearranged to form a grammatically
correct sentence.

Example: people

afternoon

never

some

cry

This forms the sentence: “Some people never cry.” The word “afternoon” is dropped.

In each of the following examples, you will see some scrambled sentences like this. Please write
the correct sentence in the blank line provided below each example.

1. feather

his

Chris

appearance

improved

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

2. high

aspirations

nightingale

Terry

has

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

3. money

gain

lovable

we

much

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

4. much

fun

Andy

has

hungry

Correct sentence: _____________________________________
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5. doing

better

vacuum

we

are

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

6. his

ignorance

raises

Toby

sights

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

7. maximized

profit

the

is

spoonful

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

8. mean

Angela

is

sun

not

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

9. we

our

increased

voiceless

performance

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

10. success

we

green

for

strive

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

11. the

gold

worsen

outcome

must

not

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

12. travels

Holly

Africa

a

lot

Correct sentence: _____________________________________
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13. his

not

mood

amazing

did

deteriorate

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

14. lifestyle

Jamal

optimizes

endless

his

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

15. always

sugar

Sue

was

hopeful

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

16. nice

this

is

irritated

music

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

17. those

Sally

tiger

skills

developed

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

18. advanced

fingernail

we

have

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

19. I

car

daunting

upgraded

my

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

20. happy

umbrella

something

achieving

made

Correct sentence: _____________________________________

her

APPENDIX O: OMNIBUS ANOVA RESULTS FOR STUDY 2
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Omnibus ANOVA results for Study 2

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

372.31

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

13.31

< .001

Trait Type × Condition

0.58

.56

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Condition

1.42

.24

Behavior Valence

24.87

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.93

.34

Behavior Valence ×Condition

2.06

.13

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Condition

0.39

.68

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

1.51

.22

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.27

.04

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Condition

2.32

.10

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Condition

1.10

.34

Behavior Referent

14.92

< .001

Condition

4.03

.02

Behavior Referent × Condition

1.99

.14

APPENDIX P: TRAIT TYPE × BEHAVIOR VALENCE × BEHAVIOR REFERENT
IN CONTROL CONDITION OF STUDY 2
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Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent in Control Condition of Study 2

Effect

F

p

150.21

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

3.53

.06

Behavior Valence

4.40

.04

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

2.15

.15

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.63

.43

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.41

.04

Behavior Referent

17.62

< .001

Trait Type

APPENDIX Q: TRAIT TYPE × BEHAVIOR VALENCE × BEHAVIOR REFERENT
IN PRIMING BEFORE ENCODING CONDITION OF STUDY 2
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Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent in Priming Before Encoding Condition of
Study 2

Effect

F

p

125.08

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

1.43

.24

Behavior Valence

17.73

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.004

.95

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.61

.44

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.003

.96

Behavior Referent

195.68

< .001

Trait Type

APPENDIX R: TRAIT TYPE × BEHAVIOR VALENCE × BEHAVIOR REFERENT
IN PRIMING AFTER ENCODING CONDITION OF STUDY 2
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Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent in Priming After Encoding Condition of
Study 2

Effect

F

p

109.32

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

9.82

.002

Behavior Valence

4.72

.03

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.13

.72

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

4.95

.03

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

3.29

.07

296.04

< .001

Trait Type

Behavior Referent

APPENDIX S: FULL RESULTS OF ANOVA IN STUDY 2 COMPARING
CONTROL CONDITION WITH PRIMING BEFORE ENCODING CONDITION
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Full results of Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Condition with condition
restricted to control and priming before encoding

Effect

F

p

263.36

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

4.39

.04

Trait Type × Condition

0.51

.48

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Condition

0.08

.78

Behavior Valence

21.53

<.001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.90

.34

Behavior Valence × Condition

4.26

.04

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Condition

0.73

.40

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.03

.86

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.46

.23

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Condition

1.27

.26

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Condition

1.69

.196

Behavior Referent

9.35

.003

Condition

1.42

.23

Behavior Referent × Condition

3.94

.048

Trait Type

APPENDIX T: SCALES FOR PRETEST OF TRAITS

166
How well do the following traits describe you?
0
1
Does not
describe me
at all

2

3

4
5
Describes
me moderately
well

6

7

8
Describes
me very
well

6

7

8
Very
important
to me

6

7

8
Very
important

How important is it for you to have the following traits?
0
1
Not
important
to me at all

2

3

4
5
Somewhat
important
to me

How important is it for you that other people are ...?
0
1
Not
important

2

3

4
5
Somewhat
important

How positive or negative do you think the following traits are?
-4
-3
Extremely
negative

-2

-1

0
1
Neither
positive nor negative

2

3

4
Extremely
positive

7

8
Extremely
upset

How upset would you be if someone said you were ...?
0
Not
upset
at all

1

2

3

4
5
Somewhat
upset

6
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How upset would you be if someone else was ...?
0
Not
upset
at all

1

2

3

4
5
Somewhat
upset

6

7

8
Extremely
upset

APPENDIX U: SCALES FOR PRETEST OF BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTIONS
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1. How positive or negative do you think the following behaviors are:
-4
-3
Extremely
negative

-2

-1

0
1
Neither
positive nor negative

2

3

4
Extremely
positive

2. How important is it for you to perform (or not perform) the following behaviors:
-4
-3
-2
Not performing
the behavior is
extremely important
to me

-1

0
1
Performing
or not performing
the behavior is
not important to me

2

3

4
Performing the
behavior is
extremely important
to me

3. Indicate below if performing the behavior would tell you a great deal about how <insert trait>
a person is [informative behavior], or very little about how <insert trait> a person is [behavior
that is not informative]:
0
1
Not informative
at all

2

3

4
5
Somewhat
informative

6

7

8
Extremely
informative

4. In this next part please again consider the behaviors that will be listed. However, this time
please rate how descriptive they are for the following specific trait dimensions (ranging from
positive to negative).
a. Trustworthy/Untrustworthy: The degree to which a person is dependable (or
undependable).
b. Modest/Immodest: The degree to which the behavior of a person does not (or does)
show excessive pride.
c. Competent/Incompetent: The degree to which a person is successful (or unsuccessful)
in producing a desired or intended result.
d. Meticulous/Sloppy: The degree to which a person cares about getting everything
perfectly right (or does not care about it at all).
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Scale:
0
Not descriptive
at all

1

2

3
Moderately
descriptive

4

5

6
Very
descriptive

Each behavior was evaluated against each trait dimension (trustworthy/untrustworthy,
modest/immodest, competent/incompetent, meticulous/sloppy)

APPENDIX V: BEHAVIORS SELECTED FROM PRETEST RESULTS
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Competency Dimension
Competent
1. X would spot crucial mistakes in the work process and correct them.
2. X would quickly learn to use new technologies.
3. X would always finish projects well before the deadline.
4. X would be hired for the well-paying job X applied for.
Incompetent
5. When X would cook a meal for friends, everyone would end up in the hospital with foodpoisoning.
6. When X would be put in charge of a club’s finances, X would mis-add the numbers in the
club accounts and the club would go bankrupt.
7. X would try to fix a leaky bathroom faucet and end up flooding the whole house.
8. X would try to fix X’s car’s engine and blow up the car.
Meticulous
9. X would spell check X’s shopping lists.
10. X would iron clothing items before putting them into the closet.
11. X would pre-wash all dishes by hand before putting them into the dishwasher.
12. When X cut pieces of wood for a project, X would measure each piece 4 times to ensure
that they were exactly the same length.
Sloppy
13. X would let weeds grow in X’s front yard.
14. After a meal X would always have crumbs or sauce around the mouth.
15. X would often put CDs into whatever case came to hand regardless of the label.
16. X would let dust accumulate on X’s furniture.
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Morality Dimension
Trustworthy
17. X would keep secrets when asked to.
18. X would follow through on a promise made to friends.
19. A teacher would leave X alone in a room while taking a test and not be afraid that X
would cheat.
20. People would be willing to tell X embarrassing things about themselves in confidence.
Untrustworthy
21. X would borrow other people’s belongings without their knowledge.
22. X would be unfaithful when in an intimate relationship.
23. X would often lie to X’s parents.
24. X would not pay back money that X owed to a friend.
Modest
25. X would take the focus off X and redirect it to others.
26. X would let some of X’s achievements go by unaccredited.
27. X would give others the credit for a group success.
28. X would never openly brag about X’s accomplishments.
Immodest
29. X would act in a condescending manner to other people.
30. X would point out others’ weaknesses to make X look better.
31. X would talk more about X than about others.
32. X would like to show off in front of others.

APPENDIX W: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING BOTH MORALITY DIMENSION AND COMPETENCE
DIMENSION IN STUDY 3 DATA COLLECTION 1
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Results of 2 (Domain: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2
(Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-model
ANOVA for Data Collection 1 in Study 3

Effect

F

p

Domain

9.40

.002

Domain × Behavior Referent

0.01

.92

Trait Type

66.09

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.63

.43

Behavior Valence

55.02

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.04

.85

Domain × Trait Type

19.79

< .001

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.52

.47

Domain × Behavior Valence

56.77

< .001

Domain × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.44

.51

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

91.86

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.55

.21

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.06

.08

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.05

.83

Behavior Referent

14.95

< .001

APPENDIX X: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING FOR MORALITY DIMENSION ONLY IN STUDY 3 DATA
COLLECTION 1
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Full results of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Morality Domain of Data Collection 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

87.05

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

1.27

.26

Behavior Valence

0.14

.71

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.38

.54

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

31.45

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.55

.46

Behavior Referent

14.18

<.001

APPENDIX Y: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING FOR COMPETENCE DIMENSION ONLY IN STUDY 3 DATA
COLLECTION 1
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Full results of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Competence Domain of Data Collection 1

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

6.40

.01

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.003

.96

Behavior Valence

108.20

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.12

.73

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

64.92

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.08

.30

Behavior Referent

9.85

.002

APPENDIX Z: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING BOTH MORALITY DIMENSION AND COMPETENCE
DIMENSION IN STUDY 3 DATA COLLECTION 2
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Results of 2 (Domain: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2
(Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) mixed-model
ANOVA for Data Collection 2 in Study 3

Effect

F

p

Domain

0.43

.51

Domain × Behavior Referent

0.24

.62

Trait Type

77.57

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

2.56

.11

Behavior Valence

67.49

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.06

.81

Domain × Trait Type

15.06

< .001

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.12

.73

Domain × Behavior Valence

78.71

< .001

Domain × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.21

.65

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

75.15

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.09

.30

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

0.88

.35

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.23

.64

Behavior Referent

8.19

.005

APPENDIX AA: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING FOR MORALITY DIMENSION ONLY IN STUDY 3 DATA
COLLECTION 2
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Full results of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Morality Domain of Data Collection 2

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

89.26

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

2.10

.15

Behavior Valence

1.81

.18

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.31

.58

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

28.52

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.16

.28

Behavior Referent

8.67

.004

APPENDIX BB: COMPLETE RESULTS OF MIXED-MODEL ANOVA
CONTAINING FOR COMPETENCE DIMENSION ONLY IN STUDY 3 DATA
COLLECTION 2
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Full results of the ANOVA for Trait Type, Behavior Valence and Behavior Referent as
Independent Variables in the Competence Domain of Data Collection 2

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

11.14

.001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.72

.40

121.36

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.03

.87

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

42.40

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.13

.72

Behavior Referent

4.38

.04

Behavior Valence

APPENDIX CC: FULL RESULTS OF COMPARISON OF STUDY 3 DATA
COLLECTION 1 WITH DATA COLLECTION 2

187
2 (Domain: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior
Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Source: data
collection 1 vs. data collection 2) mixed-model ANOVA

Effect

F

p

Domain

6.47

.01

Domain × Behavior Referent

0.18

.67

Domain × Source

2.45

.12

Domain × Behavior Referent × Source

0.09

.76

143.40

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

2.86

.09

Trait Type × Source

0.21

.65

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Source

0.32

.57

Behavior Valence

121.85

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.001

.98

Behavior Valence × Source

0.12

.73

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Source

0.09

.77

Domain × Trait Type

34.69

< .001

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Referent

0.57

.45

Domain × Trait Type × Source

0.16

.69

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Source

0.07

.79

134.88

< .001

Domain × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.02

.89

Domain × Behavior Valence × Source

1.22

.27

Domain × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Source

0.62

.43

166.60

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.02

.89

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Source

0.44

.51

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Source

2.62

.11

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence

3.52

.06

Trait Type

Domain × Behavior Valence

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

(continued on next page)
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Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.24

.62

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Source

0.25

.62

Domain × Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Source

0.04

.84

Behavior Referent

22.55

< .001

Source

0.05

.82

Behavior Referent × Source

0.43

.51

APPENDIX DD: FULL RESULTS OF COMPARISON OF STUDY 2
WITH STUDY 3 DATA COLLECTION 2
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2 (Trait Type: central vs. peripheral) × 2 (Behavior Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Behavior
Referent: self vs. Chris) × 2 (Source: Control condition in Study 2 vs. Study 3 data collection 2)
mixed-model ANOVA

Effect

F

p

Trait Type

96.22

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Referent

3.37

.07

Trait Type × Source

0.98

.32

Trait Type × Behavior Referent × Source

0.03

.86

Behavior Valence

1.50

.22

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.74

.39

Behavior Valence × Source

0.13

.72

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Source

0.04

.84

Trait Type × Behavior Valence

33.55

< .001

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

1.15

.28

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Source

0.38

.54

Trait Type × Behavior Valence × Behavior Valence × Source

5.59

.02

Behavior Referent

27.73

< .001

Source

9.98

.002

Behavior Referent × Source

3.55

.06

APPENDIX EE: FULL RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF TRAIT DIMENSIONS IN
STUDIES 1 AND 2
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Full Results of Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent × Trait Dimension mixed-model ANOVA
for central traits

Study 1
Effect

F

p

Trait Dimension

34.50

< .001

Trait Dimension × Behavior Referent

1.15

.29

Behavior Valence

31.90

< .001

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

8.01

.005

Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence

50.66

< .001

Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

2.16

.14

Behavior Referent

15.76

< .001

Decomposition of the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (F(1, 512)
= 8.01, p = .005, ηp2 = .02) showed that for positive behaviors self-referent behaviors were not
recalled significantly more or less than Chris-referent behaviors (p = .10). However, for negative
behaviors self-referent behaviors (M = .19, SD = .15) were recalled significantly less than Chrisreferent behaviors (M = .27, SD = .18), F(1, 512) = 23.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. This interaction
effect also qualified the significant behavior valence (F(1, 512) = 31.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .06) and
behavior referent (F(1, 512) = 15.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .03) main effects.
Decomposition of the Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence interaction effect (F(1, 512) =
50.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .09) showed that for the trustworthy trait dimension there was no
significant difference in recall of positive (trustworthy) and negative (untrustworthy) behaviors
(p = .16). However, for the kind trait dimension positive (kind) behavior (M = .34, SD = .24)
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were recalled more than negative (unkind) behaviors (M = .23, SD = .22), F(1, 513) = 75.83, p <
.001, ηp2 = .13. This interaction effect also qualified the trait dimension main effect (F(1, 512) =
34.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .06].)

Study 2
Effect

F

p

Trait Dimension

28.70

< .001

Trait Dimension × Behavior Referent

0.75

.39

Behavior Valence

4.17

.04

Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

4.74

.03

Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence

19.84

< .001

Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent

0.37

< .54

Behavior Referent

22.87

< .001

Decomposition of the Behavior Valence × Behavior Referent interaction effect (F(1, 298)
= 4.74, p = .03, ηp2 = .02) showed that for positive behaviors self-referent behaviors (M = .25, SD
= .19) were recalled less than Chris-referent behaviors (M = .31, SD = .18), F(1, 298) = 8.76, p =
.003, ηp2 = .03. This pattern was even more pronounced for negative behaviors: self-referent
behaviors (M = .20, SD = .18) were recalled significantly less than Chris-referent behaviors (M =
.31, SD = .19), F(1, 298) = 28.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. This interaction effect also qualified the
significant behavior valence (F(1, 298) = 4.17, p = .04, ηp2 = .01) and behavior referent (F(1,
298) = 22.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .07) main effects.
Decomposition of the Trait Dimension × Behavior Valence interaction effect(F(1, 298) =
19.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .06) showed that for the trustworthy trait dimension positive (trustworthy)
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behaviors (M = .23, SD = .21) were recalled less than negative (untrustworthy) behaviors (M =
.26, SD = .23), F(1, 299) = 4.66, p = .03, ηp2 = .02. However, for the kind trait dimension
positive (kind) behaviors (M = .34, SD = .25) were recalled more than negative (unkind)
behaviors (M = .27, SD = .25), F(1, 299) = 17.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. This interaction effect also
qualified the trait dimension main effect (F(1, 298) = 28.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .09).

